



**A**  
**Report**  
*of the*  
**Elections Task Force**  
*to the*  
**Board of Supervisors,**  
**City and County of San Francisco**

**May 1, 1995**

**Members:**

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Carmen White, Vice-Chair  
Ramon Arias  
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# FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTIONS TASK FORCE

## INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 1994 San Francisco voters passed Proposition L, which created a 9-member task force to find a better way to elect members of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.

Proposition L defined the duties of the task force as follows:

The election task force shall prepare one or more plans, in the form of proposed charter amendments, that will provide the people of the City and County of San Francisco with a fair and adequate method of electing members of the board of supervisors to represent the People of the City and County. In preparing these plans, the task force shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the costs associated with seeking election to the board of supervisors, effective representation of the diversity of the City's neighborhoods and communities, the effect on the legislative process of establishing geographical districts within the City, the most appropriate number of supervisorial seats and the compensation provided to the members of the board of supervisors. The task force, in fulfilling this duty, shall consult with the registrar of voters. In order that the board of supervisors may present a charter amendment to voters on this issue at the November 1995 election, the elections task force shall present its plans to the board of supervisors no later than May 1, 1995.

The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the Registrar of Voters each appointed three members to the Elections Task Force. Christopher Bowman, Nancy Lenvin, and Samson Wong were appointed by the Mayor; Dale Butler, Gwenn Craig and Eric Mar were appointed by the Board of Supervisors; and the Registrar of Voters appointees were Ramon Arias, Dale Shimasaki, and Carmen White. Registrar of Voters Germaine Q Wong served as an ex-officio member. The Task Force was ably advised by John Taylor, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors. Gwenn Craig was elected as Chair, Carmen White was elected Vice-Chair, Dale Butler was elected Secretary, and Christopher Bowman was elected Parliamentarian.

Proposition L allotted \$25,000 for the work of the Elections Task Force. With these funds, it hired local pollster David Binder to provide demographic and statistical data and Margie O'Driscoll to act as its staff. An Elections Task Force office and telephone were provided by the Registrar of Voters.

The Elections Task Force met weekly on Thursdays commencing on January 26, 1995, until it submitted its report, due to the Board of Supervisors on May 1, 1995.

## BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

### Technical Investigation

Initially, the Task Force members determined that they needed basic information about the current system, other voting systems and voting system requirements. Therefore they

requested the assistance of various individuals and groups who graciously provided both time and written materials for both the members of the Elections Task Force and the general public.

Primarily during its first six weeks of work, the members received and analyzed various treatises and articles on voting systems prepared by political scientists associated with various universities, as well as representatives of local and national non-profit organizations, dedicated to improving voting systems. In addition, it received reports on the number and salaries of supervisors in other counties and council member in other cities in California.

At its meetings in February and early March, various speakers were invited to make presentations to the Elections Task Force on a variety of matters. These speakers included: long time district elections advocates Calvin Welch and Jim Morales; Steven Hill, Regional Director of the Center for Voting and Democracy, who discussed nonpartisan forms of proportional representational voting: limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting (including single transferable vote); Professor of Political Science, Richard DeLeon, of San Francisco State University, who provided background studies and bibliographies and also urged the Task Force to look beyond at-large or district elections of supervisors to consider alternative voting systems and presented a set of questions for the task force to consider as it developed its proposals; and Deputy City Attorney Randy Riddle who discussed the legal requirements of voting systems and compliance with the Voting Rights Act. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and the Asian Law Caucus were also invited to address the Task Force regarding their experience with the Voting Rights Act, but, unfortunately, none of them were able to send representatives to any of the Task Force meetings.

Each of the regularly scheduled meetings of the Elections Task Force were attended by members of the public who included representatives from community organizations, experts in the field of voting systems, people with experience in instituting voting systems in other cities, reporters, and, on occasions, members of the Board of Supervisors as well as their aides. These individuals were active participants in the discussions and deliberations of the Elections Task Force.

### Public Outreach

One of the first concerns of the Elections Task Force was to be sure members of the public had ample opportunity to receive information and to comment on its work and any tentative proposals that might be made.

To solicit public opinion, in February, the Elections Task Force drafted a questionnaire that was mailed to over 1,00 civic organizations in San Francisco on February 25, 1995. Moreover, the questionnaire was available at the front counter of the Registrar of Voters office. The questionnaire asked 13 questions about the current at-large system of electing supervisors, the respondent's evaluation of generic types of voting systems (which were also described), the respondent's attitude toward district elections, and other pertinent matters. Over 186 responses were received and tabulated. The questionnaire and the tabulation of responses are Item A of the Appendix.

The Task Force also planned and held a series of five neighborhood meetings between March 11 and March 25, 1995 to obtain public comment on types of voting systems and to receive public comment on the subject of electing supervisors. The schedule of the first series of

meetings was included with the questionnaire that was mailed on February 25, 1995, and the meetings were formally announced with press releases on February 24, 1995, which were sent to local media, including neighborhood, ethnic, and gay/lesbian press. Paid advertisements were also placed in Sing Tao, El Mensajero, and the Sun Reporter. In addition, the Task Force hired translators for the meetings and the questionnaire was translated into Chinese and Spanish. The meetings were held at Yick Wo Alternative School (Chinatown/North Beach); Roosevelt Middle School (Richmond District); Southeast Community Facility (Bayview/Hunters Point), San Francisco State University (Sunset District) and New College (Mission District).

The attendance at the first four of the five public meetings was very poor. Only the last meeting, held in the Mission, drew approximately 25 participants. Although the meetings were poorly attended, a variety of opinions and concerns were expressed. At the Chinatown community meeting, for example, the importance of keeping choices simple was stressed by two speakers. At the Bayview/Hunters Point meeting, two speakers spoke against district elections and two spoke in favor of district elections. District elections were criticized as not providing enough representation and for allowing a particular neighborhood's concerns to be ignored by the rest of the supervisors. Support for District Elections was voiced at meetings in the Richmond District and the Mission. Speakers favoring district elections believed only neighborhood representatives would advocate for the neighborhood's needs and be accountable. Many speakers expressed interest in learning more about alternative voting systems. Registrar of Voters, Germaine Q. Wong, who attended both the regular meetings of the Task Force as an ex-officio member and the community meetings, provided valuable information regarding practical matters that had to be considered in evaluating voting systems.

At the same time as the system proposals were being analyzed, the Task Force also proceeded to obtain information regarding other matters which it believed to be included in its charge from Proposition L: the salary to be paid supervisors, whether to hold elections in odd or even years, and the cost of getting elected. Commissioner Shimasaki prepared a report on salaries based on data obtained from other counties and cities (See Appendix C) and Commissioner Bowman reviewed historical data on the monies spent by candidates in San Francisco elections under both district and at large systems (See Appendix D), and both Commissioners Butler and Bowman reviewed data and arguments on whether to hold elections in odd or even years (See Appendix E).

### ***EVALUATION OF EXISTING SYSTEM***

At the conclusion of its preliminary evaluation of the technical materials and listening to public comment, the Elections Task Force determined that the present system of electing supervisors was flawed and failed to provide adequate representation for most of the diverse populations of San Francisco. The Elections Task Force determined that it wished to seek a system that would result in a Board of Supervisors that would more closely reflect the ethnic, political, social, and economic diversity of San Francisco.

For most of the 20th Century, members of San Francisco's Board of Supervisors have been elected citywide (i.e., "at-large system"), staggered elections, with the exception of the 1977 and 1979 elections which were held pursuant to a voter adopted district election system. District elections ended when voters chose to return to the at-large system of electing supervisors. In the

at-large system, each San Francisco voter has as many votes as there are seats that are up for election. The top vote vote-getters are elected. Such elections are typically viewed as "winner take all." Mathematically, the largest voting bloc (normally a plurality, not a majority) that votes only for candidates sympathetic to that voting bloc will not just capture the number of seats equal to its percentage of the voting public, but will capture all seats on the legislative body. In other words, if there were a hypothetical city having 100 people with three identifiable groups, the A's (30% of the population), the B's (40% of the population) and the C's (30% of the population), in a truly representative 10 member legislative body would consist of 3 A's, 4 B's and 3 C's. In an at-large, winner-take-all election, however, the B's would win all ten seats.

### *THE INITIAL PROPOSALS*

After attending the neighborhood meetings, reviewing the written materials, and evaluating presentations made to it, the Elections Task Force selected four proposals for further community consideration and made three preliminary determinations regarding the other matters in its purview.

#### VOTING METHODS - FOUR SAMPLE PROPOSALS

Its preliminary voting system proposals were: (1) at-large elections of 11 supervisors elected using cumulative voting, (2) district elections with 11 single-member districts, with each supervisor elected using the preference voting method, (3) a mixed system of 9 single-member districts and 2 at-large supervisors elected using traditional "winner-take-all" voting with run-offs, if necessary, and (4) a system of 5 districts each having 3 supervisors elected using cumulative voting.

##### 1. At-large with Cumulative Voting.

The at-large system with cumulative voting was presented to determine whether there was support for an at-large system but utilizing a new manner of casting votes for the candidates. In cumulative voting, each voter would have the same number of votes as the number of seats to be filled in an election but, unlike the current system, the voter could give all of his or her 5 or 6 votes to one candidate or divide the votes among candidates any way the voter wishes

Examples:           2 votes for A, 2 votes for B and 1 vote for C,

                          3 votes for A and 2 for B,

                          1 vote for A, 1 vote for B, 1 vote for C and 2 votes for D.

Cumulative voting is being used in several cities in Illinois, one in Alabama, one in New Mexico, and at least one in Maryland. It is a system that has been selected by courts in voting rights cases to ensure minority representation on legislative bodies where the minority communities are dispersed throughout a locality and are not living in compact, definable geographic districts.

##### 2. 11 Single-Member Districts With Preference Voting

A plan that was very similar to the District Election system used in San Francisco in 1977 and 1979 was presented, but used "single transferable vote" (a form of Preference Voting) for the selection of a representative in each district.

This plan was presented to determine whether there was support for district elections and to test reaction to a new voting system.

In the single transferable vote system, voters designate their 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices. In counting ballots under this system, all first choice votes are counted. If no candidate receives a majority of votes, the candidate who received the least number of votes, would be eliminated. All voters, who listed the eliminated candidate as their first choice, would have their vote transferred to their second choice. If these transferred votes failed to qualify a winner, the candidate who finished second-to last would be eliminated and all voters, who listed the second eliminated candidate as their first choice, would have their vote transferred to their second choice. This process would continue until one candidate received a majority of the votes cast (50% plus 1, or the ballots are exhausted, in which case, a run off would be held. Preference voting of this type is seen as having fewer "wasted" votes.

### 3. A Mixed System with Traditional Voting

A mixed system (9 districts and 2 at-large) was presented to determine whether the public, who had at different times both adopted and rejected district elections, would support a system that attempted to blend elements of both systems. It would also provide voters access to more than one supervisor. The districts would be larger than they would be under an 11 district system and there would be 2 at-large supervisors who would have to campaign and respond to citywide concerns. The at-large supervisor elected in each election cycle would become president of the Board. Voting as presently done in San Francisco, but with run-offs, if necessary, was part of this proposal.

### 4. Multi-member Districts with Cumulative Voting

This proposal included the creation of 5 districts, each having 3 supervisors. Voters in each district would elect their 3 representatives using the cumulative voting method. This proposal, which would increase the Board to 15 members, was thought to be the best system for providing both larger districts (seen as fostering a more city wide perspective) and minority group representation since with cumulative voting it was believed that at least 3 major groups in each district would have a better chance to elect representatives that would promote their interests. The proposal also tested public reaction to expanding the number of Supervisors.

## OTHER PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the voting proposals, the Task Force made several tentative recommendations regarding other matters outlined in Proposition L.

### 1. Full-time/Part-time/Salaries:

The Elections Task Force believed that the job of being a member of the Board of Supervisors had become a full-time job and that, therefore, a full-time



salary for each member was appropriate. After reviewing what other counties paid their supervisors and cities paid their council members, and considering various other factors, the Task Force recommended for the public's consideration a proposal that would increase the salary of each supervisor to 15% above the salary of the highest paid aides to the supervisors. In the current fiscal year, this would translate to an annual salary of approximately \$51,000.

## 2. When to Hold Elections:

Until 1980, Supervisors were elected in odd-numbered years; since 1980 they have been elected in even-numbered years. In even-numbered year elections, public and media attention is focused on national and statewide races and issues, rather than local ones. The Task Force also analyzed information that indicated that the longer the ballot and the longer the list of candidates to be elected, a larger percentage of voters failed to vote in races closer to the bottom of the ballot. Therefore, the Task Force proposed for public consideration that supervisors be elected in odd-numbered years so that more attention could be focused on local candidates and issues.

## 3. Cost of Getting Elected:

The Task Force determined that in the 1970's under the at-large system and the district election system, the cost of getting elected was nearly identical. Moreover, the Elections Task Force found that there were wide disparities in the amounts of money successful candidates spent to be elected and that the amount of money spent in recent years on elections had grown tremendously. Given the recent passage of a voluntary campaign spending reform measure by the Board of Supervisors, the Task Force applauded such efforts and suggested that in the event elections were to be held, not citywide, but in districts, that voluntary campaign expenditure limits be appropriately and/or substantially lowered.

## PUBLIC OUTREACH ON PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS

The initial proposals were summarized in a Preliminary Report of the Elections Task Force. The Preliminary Report was mailed to the Election Task Force's mailing list that consisted of those who had attended its meetings or had requested information. In addition, it was delivered to members of the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor and mailed to all city wide and community newspapers. Copies of the report were also made available at the Registrar of Voters office, at all community meetings and at Task Force meetings, in addition to dissemination by individual members of the Task Force to interested groups and individuals.

The proposals were discussed with the editorial boards of the Examiner, Chronicle and Independent. As a result, an editorial was written in the Examiner; the work of the Task Force appeared in feature columns in the Examiner, Chronicle and Independent, and news stories appeared in the Examiner and Independent. (For a sample of such articles, see Item B of Appendix). In addition, Commissioner Bowman and Registrar Wong appeared on the SF Politics television show.

The Elections Task Force scheduled six additional community meetings to distribute the proposals and to obtain feedback from the community. These were held in the Western Addition



(Ella Hill Hutch Community Center), Chinatown (Chinese Culture Foundation), the Haight Ashbury (the Park Branch Library); the Marina (Ft. Mason Conference Center), Bernal Heights (Bernal Heights Neighborhood Center) and the West of Twin Peaks (Commodore Sloat School). In addition to these formally scheduled meetings, individual members of the Task Force made presentations to approximately 25 community groups including neighborhood organizations and political clubs.

The second round of meetings were better attended, although not substantially so, with the exception of the meetings at the Park Branch Library in conjunction with a meeting of the Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council and the ones at the Bernal Heights Neighborhood Center and at the Commodore Sloat School. Reactions to the proposals, however, were quite varied and very instructive.

Those who were, and remain, passionate advocates of district elections voiced their continuing support. Those supporting district elections believed that the best form of government was to have distinct neighborhoods represented by accountable representatives. In addition, they felt that the current method of voting, with the addition of run-offs, if no candidate received a majority of the votes cast, should be used.

Support for city-wide elections was less pronounced among those attending the meetings.

Reaction to the proportional (PR) voting systems varied widely. Most believed that they were too complicated, particularly preference voting. Some were concerned that a new voting system would prevent any election reform from being instituted, most notably district elections. Those who had been active politically and were interested in voting systems, while having an initial negative reaction to the PR voting systems, expressed willingness to learn more about them at a future time, after a new system were in place. A willingness to consider other voting systems was also expressed by those who thought that a traditional district elections system might not provide a representative for the specific ethnic communities (i.e., Hispanics and African Americans).

There was uniform and widespread support for continuing efforts to control the costs of getting elected.

The years in which to hold elections was a matter of some debate. There was a concern among those favoring liberal causes that changing the elections of supervisors to years in which there was not a state or national election would reduce liberal turnout for supervisor races. Others supported the change, so that voters and the media could focus on local issues and candidates. In discussions about this issue, the support for odd-numbered year elections of supervisors was increased with the notion that perhaps all city officials should be elected in the odd-numbered years.

The salary proposal received extensive support at the community meetings, although there was recognition that there might be opposition in the general public. It was suggested on several occasions that this issue not be included in any charter amendment dealing with voter systems and that the issue be addressed in a separate charter amendment.

## **ELECTIONS TASK FORCE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

### ***Ballot Measures for Voting on the Method of Electing the Board of Supervisors - Declaration of Policy and Charter Amendment***

The Elections Task Force recommends to the Board of Supervisors that the Board place (1) a declaration of policy on the November ballot which would ask voters whether they want to change the present system of electing supervisors, and (2) a companion charter amendment on the ballot, asking voters to indicate the election method(s) which they favor. In this way, voters would first indicate whether they wanted to change the system of electing supervisors. If a majority voted not to change the method of electing supervisors, the existing system would remain. If the majority of voters do vote in favor of a change, the method receiving the majority of votes cast for the measure would be the method adopted as a charter amendment. If no method received a majority vote (50%+1), there would be a run-off at the next scheduled election between the two methods receiving the highest number of votes. The Task Force recommends that four methods be placed on the ballot. These methods are described in more detail below.

### ***Election of the Board of Supervisors in Odd Numbered Years - Charter Amendment***

The Elections Task Force further recommends that a separate charter amendment be placed on the November 1995 ballot to move the election of supervisors and all other city officials to odd-numbered years from even-numbered years.

### ***Full-time Supervisors - Charter Amendment***

In addition, the Elections Task Force recommends another charter amendment making the supervisors full-time positions with a salary 15% above the salary of their highest paid aides. Furthermore, supervisors would be barred from outside earned income, and they would be required to comply with the provisions of Proposition 112 (see Appendix C).

### ***Other Recommendations***

The Elections Task Force also recommends that specific criteria be followed in drafting district lines, should a district system be chosen, and that the method of filling vacancies on the Board of Supervisors be changed.

### ***RECOMMENDATION #1: THE ELECTION SYSTEM PROPOSALS***

The Elections Task Force determined that how the issues were framed for the voters was almost as important as the proposed methodology for electing the Board of Supervisors. After extensive discussion and review of options, the Elections Task Force recommends that the question of the method of electing supervisors be in two parts:

1. The first part would ask if the voter wished to change the current at-large system of electing the Board of Supervisors.
2. The second part would instruct the voter to vote for one, some, or all of the alternate proposals for electing the Board. If a majority of the votes cast determined that a change was desired, then the votes for the alternative systems would become effective. If none of the systems receives a majority of the votes cast for the measure, then a run-off election at the next regularly scheduled election would be held between

the two systems receiving the highest number of votes. This method is modeled after the ballot method used by New Zealand in 1992 in electing its governing body.

The Elections Task Force recognized that voter education is imperative in the citizen evaluation and selection process. The Elections Task Force strongly urges that an appropriate education campaign be undertaken in order to ensure an informed decision by the electorate. Foundation grants may be available for this purpose.

### ***Proposal One: District Elections Using the Current Voting System***

- San Francisco would be divided into 11 districts each containing approximately, 66,000 people, using 1990 Census data.
- Elections in each district would be held every four years, but the elections would be staggered so that only 5 or 6 of the districts would hold elections for supervisor in any one election.
- Run-offs would be required if no candidate received a majority of the votes cast in the district.
- The Board President would be elected by the Supervisors and would serve a two-year term.
- Only registered voters living in the district may vote for a candidate from that district, and candidates must reside in the district for which they are running for supervisor.

#### District Lines

The Elections Task Force did not have sufficient time to draw maps for these districts. However, it strongly recommends that the following criteria be utilized to the extent reasonably possible in drawing district lines:

1. Districts should optimize the voting power of minorities (ethnic, racial, political, social and economic), be geographically compact and contiguous, recognize geographic boundaries in the city, and keep distinct neighborhoods intact.
2. In creating districts that optimize the voting power of minorities, consideration should be given to appropriate data from the latest U.S. Census as well as more recent data on voter registration statistics, voter turnout, and voting patterns.
3. All districts must conform to all legal requirements, including the requirement that they be equal in population. Population variations should be limited to 1% from the statistical mean unless additional variations, limited to 5% of the statistical mean, are necessary to optimize the voting power of minorities and/or to keep recognized neighborhoods intact.
4. The district map used for the 1977 and 1979 elections, and the map proposed for adoption in 1987 should not be used as models, because they do not reflect the demographic changes over the past 18 years, especially among racial and ethnic minorities. Of numerous sample maps presented to the Elections Task Force by members of the public, its own members, the Registrar of Voters, and its consultant, David Binder, there exist sample districts that more nearly meet the foregoing criteria.

The Elections Task Force further recommends that the Board of Supervisors not draw the district boundaries. Instead, it recommends that a committee or task force be established consisting of 9 members, 3 appointed by the Mayor, 3 appointed by the Board of Supervisors, and 3 appointed by the Registrar of Voters. The Registrar of Voters would serve as an ex

officio member. This committee would create the districts in accordance with the criteria set forth in this report after holding hearings and soliciting public input. After the publication of each subsequent U.S. Census, the Registrar of Voters will report to the Board of Supervisors on whether the existing districts continue to meet the legal requirements and the criteria set forth in this report. If it is determined that they are out of compliance, a new committee or task force will be established to re-draw the districts to bring them into compliance.

### ***Proposal Two: At-Large Elections Using Preference Voting***

As with the current system, the Board of Supervisors would remain at 11. Members would be elected for four years, city-wide, on a staggered basis with 5 being elected at one election, and 6 two years later. Supervisors would be elected using preference voting, a form of proportional representation. Unlike the current system where the highest vote-getter becomes the President of the Board, the Board members would elect the President of the Board, who would serve for two years. As described below, preference voting does not allow for highest vote candidates.

Preference voting is a voting system used in Australia and many European countries. It is also used in Cambridge, Massachusetts for its City Council and School Committees, and in New York City for its School Councils. This system allows for majority and significant minority segments of a jurisdiction to be represented. (e.g. With 5 positions to be filled, 16.7% would be the winning threshold. Currently, the 5th or 6th place winner on the Board of Supervisors, needs to get between 28% and 39% of the votes.) With fewer votes needed to win a seat on the Board, candidates could target their campaigns to particular constituencies (e.g. neighborhoods, small business owners, racial minorities, environmentalists, handicapped accessibility advocates, etc.) rather than trying to reach all the voters city-wide.

In preference voting, voters rank candidates in order of preference (i.e. first choice, second choice, etc.). If a voter's first choice is not a winner, their vote transfers to their next choices until their vote helps to elect a candidate.

The Elections Task Force proposes that each voter could rank as many candidates as there are seats open in an election, five in one election and six in the following election. The threshold for winning in a five-seat election would be 100% of the votes cast divided by 5 seats plus 1. All candidates who reach the threshold on the first count would be elected. If any seats remain unfilled, the voters' second and possibly subsequent choices would be counted. This process continues until all the seats up for election are filled. A more detailed explanation of preference voting can be found in the Appendix.

Members of the Elections Task Force were not unanimous on this recommendation and the mayoral appointees to this body were unanimous in their opposition. The recommendation prevailed because most members thought that this could build greater unity at the Board of Supervisors and that the existing system invests undo power in the Mayor.

### ***Proposal Three: At-Large Elections Using Cumulative Voting.***

The 11-member Board of Supervisors would be elected by all voters (i.e., at-large) as in the present system. The terms of the Supervisors, which would remain at 4 years, would be staggered as in the present system with 5 being elected at one election and 6 at the following election. The 5 or 6 highest vote-getters would be elected as is the case in the present system.

The Board members themselves would elect the President of the Board who would serve for two years until the next election of supervisors. Unlike the present system, however, the supervisors would be elected by using cumulative voting.

Cumulative voting gives to each registered voter the same number of votes as there are seats to be filled on the Board of Supervisors. Voters may cast all of their 5 or 6 votes for one candidate or divide the votes among candidates any way the voter wishes. For example, where voters each may have 5 votes, they may cast 2 votes for G, 2 votes for B and 1 vote for L, or 4 votes for A and 1 for H, or all 5 votes for E.

Citywide or "at-large" voting systems are frequently viewed as providing a legislative body that will better serve the needs of the entire population. In San Francisco, supervisors elected at-large would be more able to focus on city-wide problems (such as the budget) and balance the provision of city-wide services such as police, fire, libraries, etc.

Cumulative voting is designed to combat the problem of the at-large, highest vote-getters "take all" elections which usually result in the largest interest group or a coalition of interest groups (which usually is not a numerical majority) winning all or most of the vacant seats. Instituting cumulative voting will allow minority constituencies to concentrate their votes in order to elect candidates to better represent their interests, thus creating a more diverse Board of Supervisors. It is a system that has been selected by courts in voting rights cases to ensure minority representation on legislative bodies where the minority communities are dispersed throughout a city and are not grouped into one or more definable, compact, geographic districts of sufficient size.

Cumulative voting has been used successfully in a number of jurisdictions, including Peoria, Illinois, Alamogordo, New Mexico, Chilton County, Alabama

#### ***Proposal Four: Five Districts Each Having Three Representatives Using Preference Voting***

The City will be divided into 5 districts, each of which, according to the 1990 census data, will have approximately 145,000 people each. Each district will have three resident Supervisors who will be elected by the people in that district. Elections will be staggered by district so that two districts will elect six supervisors (3 in each district) in one election, and three districts will elect nine supervisors (3 in each district) in the following election. Every supervisor within a district will be elected at the same time. The Board of Supervisors will select their President for two-year terms.

The Elections Task Force strongly recommends that the same criteria be applied to the creation of the five districts as described for the creation of the 11 single-member districts, i.e., each district should be geographically compact and recognize geographic boundaries, optimize the voting power of ethnic, political, social and economic minorities, and keep neighborhoods intact to the extent possible. No lines for the districts have been proposed by the Elections Task Force.

As with one of its at-large proposals, the Elections Task Force recommends that the three supervisors in each district be elected by preference voting. On each ballot, voters will designate their 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices. After the election, the Registrar of Voters would determine the number of votes a successful candidate would need to win. With three supervisors to be elected, a successful candidate must receive 25% of the votes cast (100 percent divided by 3 plus 1). The Registrar of Voters would then count each first choice vote of every voter. Candidates who

received at or above the threshold number of votes would be declared winners. If no candidate or fewer than three candidates received more than the threshold number of votes to be elected, the Registrar of Voters would then look at the ballots of the candidate who received the least number of votes. That candidate would be eliminated and all ballots cast for that candidate would be re-examined and each voter would have his/her vote transferred to their second choice and those votes would be added to the remaining candidates. If one such voter had voted as a second choice for a candidate that had been determined to have been elected in the initial count of all first choices, then the Registrar of Voters would count that voter's third choice candidate. This process would continue until 3 candidates receive the threshold number of votes and are determined to be elected.

This proposal is intended to increase the diversity of the Board of Supervisors by increasing the size of the Board, thereby making it possible for smaller voting blocs to elect a representative, and by using preference voting which prevents a dominant group from capturing all the available seats. Multi-member districts also address issues raised in public testimony received by the Task Force. While many people voiced a desire for a Board that is more in touch with and accountable to neighborhoods, they also expressed concern that single-member districts could leave numbers of district residents feeling as if they were not represented if they did not like or did not support the winning candidate. This problem is addressed by having three supervisors per district. In addition, the five districts would each be large enough to encompass a significant portion of the City, thereby encouraging supervisors to have a city-wide or broader perspective than they might under a single member district system.

The strength of this proposal is also its weakness. The Elections Task Force had serious reservations about the voters' willingness to expand the Board to 15 members, with the attendant cost increases. Nevertheless, the Elections Task Force felt this proposal had sufficient merit to warrant inclusion in its final report.

#### ***RECOMMENDATION #2: YEARS IN WHICH ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD***

The Elections Task Force recommends that the members of the Board of Supervisors should be elected in odd-numbered years rather than in the even-numbered years as is the current practice.

Until 1980, elections for members of the Board of Supervisors were held in odd-numbered years. Thereafter, the elections were switched to even-numbered years. The President of the U.S. and the Governor of California are elected in even-numbered years and their campaigns tend to increase the number of people who vote in those elections. In fact, data examined showed that the average voter turnout for November elections is 23% higher in even-numbered years when a President or Governor is elected, than in odd-numbered years when a Mayor or City Attorney is elected. (See Appendix E). The data also shows that since 1979, the last year San Franciscans voted for Supervisors at the same time as voting for Mayor, there has been a decline in the voter turnout in odd-numbered year elections.

Since 1980 the high turnout in odd-numbered year elections has been 179,546 (1989) and the low 107,920 (1985), while during the 1970's the high was 258,227 (1971) and the low 175,582 (1977). Arguably, in odd-numbered year elections, the election of members of the Board of Supervisors increased voter turnout during the 1970's.



Although the total number of voters was higher in years when there were state or national elections, the Elections Task Force determined that the number of people voting in the supervisorial races in odd-numbered years was 3% higher than the average number voting those voting for supervisor in even-numbered years because of the length of the ballot which is particularly long in the even-numbered years. The order of placement on the local ballot is mandated by State and Federal laws, which results in the placement of candidates for the Board of Supervisors near the bottom of the ballot. As a result, many of those voting for President or Governor do not vote for Supervisor.

The Elections Task Force recommends that the election of all local officials be held in odd-numbered years to focus attention on and increase interest in local issues and candidates. Arguably there would be more media attention given to local issues and voters would have a better opportunity to become acquainted with the candidates and their issues. It was also anticipated that a ballot with just local issues would be shorter and therefore easier for voters to understand and analyze. Clearly, it was also hoped that if one of the election reform proposals were adopted, there would also be increased interest and participation in the local elections.

The Task Force recommends that the issue of moving supervisorial and other locally elected officials to odd-numbered years be a separate charter amendment, and not be included with the proposal on the method of electing the Board of Supervisors. This issue should be decided on its own merits.

### ***RECOMMENDATION #3: PROPOSALS FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION***

The Elections Task Force upon recommending that Supervisorial and other local elections be held in odd-numbered years agreed that the Charter needed to be amended to provide for an orderly transition from even-numbered to odd-numbered year elections.

Specifically, the Task Force recommends that the Board of Supervisors in the same charter amendment extend on a one-time basis the length of term limits by one year, so that Supervisorial Elections and the elections of the Public Defender and Assessor not be held in 1996, but be held in 1997, and that Supervisorial elections scheduled for 1998 not be held in 1998, but be held in 1999.

We also recommend that under the two at-large system proposals (i.e. cumulative and preference), that 6 supervisors be elected in 1997 and 5 be elected in 1999, and so on.

Under the two district proposals (the 11 district plan, and the 5/3 plan), all districts be voted upon in 1997, that 5 or 2 districts, respectively, be voted upon in 1999, and that 6 or 3 districts, respectively, be voted upon in the year 2001, and so on.

### ***RECOMMENDATION #4: COMPENSATION OF SUPERVISORS***

The Elections Task Force recommends that the current compensation of members of the Board of Supervisors be increased from its current rate of \$23,928 per year which assumes that being a supervisor is only a part time job. The Elections Task Force recognized that members of the Board of Supervisors work full time and therefore determined that their compensation should reflect that fact. It therefore proposes that supervisors be paid a salary that is 15% higher than that of the highest paid aide to the Supervisors, which in fiscal 1995 would be \$51,750. In



## COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS

	<u>CURRENT SYSTEM</u>	<u>11 DISTRICTS</u>	<u>11 AT- LARGE PREFERENCE</u>	<u>11 AT- LARGE CUMULATIVE</u>	<u>5 DISTRICTS 3 SUPERVISORS EACH</u>
Total # of Members	11	11	11	11	15
# Supervisors per district	NA	1	NA	NA	3
# elected to the Board each election	5 or 6	5 or 6	5 or 6	5 or 6	6 or 9
Type of voting system	current	current	preference	cumulative	preference
# of candidates voters can vote for	up to 5 or 6 depending on number up for election	1	up to 5 or 6 depending on number up for election	up to 5 or 6 depending on number up for election	voters rank up to 3
Run-off election if no one gets 50%?	no	yes	no	no	no
Board Pres.	highest vote getter	board elects	board elects	board elects	board elects
Size of District (pop.)	NA	66,000	NA	NA	145,000

# **Elections Task Force Community Survey**

## **Results and Analysis**

**Prepared By:  
David Binder Research  
April 1995**

## Executive Summary

The following report presents the findings and analysis of the Elections Task Force Community Survey Questionnaire. The results are based on responses from 186 individuals, frequently from various community groups and political clubs. It is important to remember when reviewing these results that this survey is not a random sampling. Rather, the findings are based upon opinions from individuals who are disproportionately concerned with and informed about local politics. Further, it is not known whether or not a particular group or club responded with multiple surveys in an effort to skew the results. Therefore, results are not generalizable to a larger population, and should only be interpreted as reflecting the opinions of the 186 survey respondents.

In this report, results are shown for all respondents and for subgroups by party and ethnicity. Please note that the number of Republicans (17), independents (20), and Green Party (18) registrants is small, so results for these groups should be interpreted with caution. Similarly for ethnicity, there were too few respondents to report separate results for African-Americans (10), Asians (14), and Hispanics (13). Therefore, results are shown for "people of color" (51, including mixed race, other and native Americans.). Please see the questionnaire at the back of this report for the full question wording.

- Overall, respondents preferred the method of electing supervisors by district elections over other options, with 34% of respondents naming district elections as the first choice. Preference voting was the next highest response at 23%. Except for Republicans, all party affiliations, as well as both caucasians and people of color, preferred district elections.
- District elections was "fully supported" by 44% of all respondents when asked whether they fully supported the idea, support the idea with reservations or oppose the idea of district elections. This figure is the highest "fully support" of all voting methods presented. Again, preference voting was second with 40% full support. The greatest amount of opposition was voiced toward numbered seats at large, with 73% opposing.
- The mean number of supervisors selected by all groups except Greens and people of color was 11. Greens and people of color had a higher proportion supporting expanding the number of Supervisors. 54% of the Republican respondents supported reducing the number of Board seats.
- Overwhelming support was shown for having the job of supervisor be a full-time position by 77% of all respondents.
- Wide support was shown for limits on individual campaign contributions (59% support stricter limits) and limits on total campaign expenditures (85% support). Republicans were the only group that did not have a majority of support for limiting individual campaign contributions. The median suggested individual campaign contribution limit was \$200, and the median total expenditure limit for Supervisorial campaigns was \$100,000.

- Sixty percent (60%) of all respondents believed that supervisors should be elected in even years. Greens were the only group that supported odd-year elections with 60% in favor.
- Slightly over one-half of all respondents favored maintaining the current term limits on supervisors.
- Respondents strongly supported maintaining staggered elections (73% support).
- When respondents were asked if supervisorial district lines should be drawn by "communities of interest" or by neighborhoods in a specific geographic area, the overall response supported division by neighborhoods by 63%. Democrats and people of color were however nearly evenly divided in their preference between drawing the lines by "communities of interest" or geographic areas.
- All subgroups except Republicans believe the most important duty of the Elections Task Force is to change the method for electing supervisors. Republicans, however, believe the most important duty of the Task Force is to change the number of supervisors.

## Analysis

### Methods of Electing Supervisors

Respondents were given descriptions of the alternative methods of electing members of the Board of Supervisors and then asked to give their preference for each method.

Keeping the current at-large system was fully supported by 16% of the overall respondents with an additional 20% supporting with reservations. The strongest support for keeping the current system was among Republicans with 67% fully supporting or supporting with reservations. Democrats, non-partisans and Greens were strongly opposed. Both caucasians and people of color were opposed to keeping the current at-large system as well.

*Q1a. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of keeping the current at-large system.*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Fully Support	16%	14%	40%	11%	0%	15%	16%
Support with Reservations	20	23	27	5	17	22	14
Oppose	64	63	33	84	83	63	70

Respondents for the most part showed strong across-the-board opposition to having numbered seats at-large. Only Republicans had a large showing of support (with reservations) with 43%.

*Q1b. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of having numbered seats at-large.*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Fully Support	7%	12%	0%	0%	6%	6%	13%
Support with Reservations	20	17	43	11	0	18	13
Oppose	73	71	57	89	94	76	74

Similar to numbered seats at-large, limited voting showed widespread opposition among all groups of respondents. However, the opposition to this method was moderated with around one third to

two-fifths of the respondents in each group supporting the idea with reservations. Republicans, however, remained strong in their opposition with 75% of them opposing limited voting.

*Q1c. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of limited voting.*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Fully Support	4%	5%	8%	0%	0%	5%	3%
Support with Reservations	35	36	17	32	43	30	45
Oppose	61	59	75	68	57	66	53

Cumulative voting received full support of around one-quarter to one-third of the respondents (except for the non-partisan group with 10%). When combining the fully supporting and support with reservations votes, support for this option jumped to over 70% among all groups except Republicans and non-partisans. Republicans remained near two-thirds in opposition.

*Q1d. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of cumulative voting.*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Fully Support	26%	26%	33%	10%	38%	32%	15%
Support with Reservations	44	48	7	53	56	35	65
Oppose	30	26	60	37	6	33	20

Preference voting received its strongest support among non-partisans and Greens -- both around 90% fully supporting or supporting with reservations. Overall, however, 69% of the respondents supported this option. Republicans maintained an opposition to this proposal with 64% of the respondents as well.

*Q1e Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of preference voting.*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Fully Support	40%	36%	7%	74%	76%	46%	41%
Support with Reservations	29	31	29	16	18	23	35
Oppose	31	33	64	10	6	31	24

The method of district elections received well over a majority of support among all groups except non-partisans. Overall, 69% of the supported the idea of district elections. Greens and Democrats were the two groups giving the largest support, 78% and 68% respectively.

*Q1f. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of district elections.*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Fully Support	44%	47%	27%	37%	39%	44%	41%
Support with Reservations	23	21	33	10	39	24	23
Oppose	33	32	40	53	22	33	36

The idea of a mixed system also showed fairly strong across-the-board support. Overall, 61% of the respondents supported this idea. The strongest opposition came from Republicans (50%) and the strongest support came from Greens (82%).



*Q1g. Please indicate whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea of a mixed system.*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Fully Support	33%	33%	33%	25%	27%	28%	35%
Support with Reservations	28	29	17	31	55	30	35
Oppose	39	39	50	44	18	42	31

When respondents were asked to name their first choice among the alternative methods for electing supervisors, the overall support went to district elections with 34%. Democrats were the only group to rate district elections as their first choice (38%). Republicans preferred the current system (50%) and put district elections in second (25%) followed by cumulative voting (19%). Non-partisans chose preference voting as their first choice (50%) and district elections second (30%). Greens also chose the preference system (56%) and district elections second (28%). People of color and Caucasians both chose district elections as their first choice.

*Q2a. Please indicate which of the following options are your first preference for methods of electing the board of supervisors.*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
District Elections	34%	38%	25%	30%	28%	36%	30%
Pref. Voting	23	21	6	50	56	26	28
Current System	16	14	50	0	0	17	9
Mixed System	12	11	0	15	11	9	15
Number Seats At-Large	7	9	0	0	6	6	9
Cumul. Voting	5	6	19	5	0	7	7
Limited Voting	1	1	0	0	0	6	9

### Preferred Number of Supervisors

Regarding the preferred number of supervisors San Francisco should have, about 50% feel the City should maintain 11 supervisors. The other 50% was evenly divided between fewer and greater numbers of seats.

*Q3. In your opinion, how many Supervisors should San Francisco have?*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Five	4%	3%	13	0%	0%	5	2
Seven	15	15	31	6	6	15	13
Eight	1	1	0	6	0	1	2
Nine	8	5	6	12	6	7	2
Eleven	48	55	25	47	50	49	53
Twelve	1	0	0	0	6	1	0
Thirteen	3	2	0	6	6	3	2
Fifteen	14	13	13	24	21	12	21
More than 15	7	5	12	0	6	8	4

A large majority of the overall respondents felt that the job of supervisor should be full-time (77%) as compared to part-time (23%). Only Republicans showed less support than the overall group yet and remained nearly evenly divided. Both caucasians and people of color strongly supported the idea of having the position of supervisor be full-time, 80% and 78% respectively.

### Full-time or Part-time Supervisors

*Q4a. In your opinion, should the job of supervisor be full-time or part-time?*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Full-time	77%	87%	47%	58%	94%	80%	78%
Part-time	23	13	53	42	6	20	22

### Salary of Supervisors

Democrats were the group that gave the members of the Board of Supervisors the highest mean salary at \$46,000 a year. The lowest mean salary was given by the non-partisans at \$33,000. Both the caucasians and the people of color reflected the sentiment of higher salaries with \$44,000 and \$39,000 respectively.

*Q4b. What should be the salary of members of the Board of Supervisors?*

	Mean Salary
All Respondents	\$42,000
Democrat	46,000
Republican	36,000
Non-Partisan	33,000
Green	42,000
Caucasian	44,000
People of Color	39,000

### Limits on Campaign Spending

Nearly three in five respondents desire stricter spending on individual campaign contribution limits. Only Republicans showed less than a majority of support for this idea (41%).

*Q5a. Do you support or oppose stricter limits on individual campaign contributions?*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Support	59%	57%	41%	68%	83%	60%	58%
Oppose	41	43	59	32	17	40	42

Those respondents who supported stricter limits were then asked what they thought the new limits should be. The mean response was \$248, with the median response being \$200.

The mean campaign contribution for Republicans was \$460; the lowest mean levels were from the non-partisan and green groups at \$174 and \$171 respectively. Democrats as well as the Caucasians and people of color all chose a mean of about \$263.

*Q5c. If you support stricter limits on campaign contributions, what would be the new limit?*

	Mean Campaign Contribution
All Respondents	\$248
Democrat	263
Republican	460
Non-Partisan	174
Green	171
Caucasian	263
People of Color	264

85% of all respondents support the idea of limits on total campaign expenditures. Greens in fact were unanimous while 65% of Republicans supported the idea. People of color supported the idea with 98%.

*Q5b. Do you support or oppose limits on total campaign expenditures?*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Support	85%	90%	65%	85%	100%	82%	98%
Oppose	15	10	35	15	0	18	2

Republicans again gave the highest mean dollar figure of \$218,000 for the total campaign expenditures. Non-partisans gave the lowest mean expenditure figure of \$100,000.

Q5d. If you support stricter limits on total campaign expenditures, what should the limit be?

	Mean Total Expenditure Limit
All Respondents	\$155,000
Democrat	\$173,000
Republican	218,000
Non-Partisan	100,000
Green	108,000
Caucasian	181,000
People of Color	126,000

#### Even vs. Odd-Year Elections

A majority of respondents favored keeping the elections for the supervisors in the even years (60%). Greens preferred an odd-year election (60%) and the non-partisans and people of color were fairly evenly divided.

Q6. When do you think we should elect Supervisors?

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Even-year	60%	67%	53%	47%	40%	65%	46%
Odd-year	40	33	47	53	60	35	54

#### Term Limits

Overall, respondents showed a slight majority (54%) for maintaining the current two 4-year term limit on members of the board. Democrats were the only group to have less than a majority of respondents favoring the current system of term limits. Democrats were nearly split among choosing two 4-year term limits and no term limits at all. People of color showed stronger support than caucasians for maintaining the two 4-year term limit.

*Q7. Members of the Board of Supervisors are limited to two consecutive four year terms. Which of the following is your preference?*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
2 4-year terms	54%	49%	53%	70%	53%	48%	67%
4 2-year terms	5	4	24	0	6	5	9
1 6-year term	6	3	0	5	6	2	4
No limits	31	41	12	15	35	40	18
Other	4	3	12	10	0	6	2

### Staggered Elections

Overall support for maintaining the staggered cycle of elections was quite strong (73%). The only group to show strong opposition was the non-partisan group who preferred to have the elections all in the same cycle (68%).

*Q8. In your opinion, should all Supervisors be elected in each election cycle or should they be elected on a staggered basis?*

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Stagger	73%	80%	71%	32%	65%	73%	66%
Same cycle	27	20	29	68	35	27	34

### Likes and Dislikes of the Current System

When asked what they liked best about the current system of electing supervisors, a plurality of respondents said "nothing." All groups subgroups had similar responses, except the Republicans who like the citywide representation.

*Q9. What do you like about best about the current system of electing Supervisors?*

30%	Nothing
14	Staggered elections
10	Supervisors represent the entire city
6	Can vote for all eleven members
5	Individual supervisors are good
5	Ethnic minorities are represented on current board
4	Term limits
4	Supervisors take responsibility for citywide issues
2	Unites the City
2	Supervisors must take down campaign signs
2	Large choice of candidates
2	Can dump Republicans
14	Other

*Q9. What do you like best about the current system of electing Supervisors?*

	Democrat	Republican	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Nothing	21%	27%	62%	33%	28%	33%
Citywide representation	13	36	0	0	12	11
Staggered elections	14	0	8	8	9	15
Can vote for all supervisors	5	0	8	8	8	0

Similar to the above question, the groups were aligned in stating they most dislike the cost of the current system of electing supervisors. Republicans felt that the biggest problem was in the quality of officials that are elected.



Q10. What do you like least about the current system of electing Supervisors?

27%	Cost of campaigning
23	Lack of neighborhood representation/minority representation
7	Too much influence from business/corporations
7	Poor quality Supervisors
6	Difficult to campaign citywide/too big for grassroots campaigns
4	Lack of limits on campaign spending
4	Too many Supervisors/seats
2	Too many candidates
2	Only the rich can win elections
2	System ignores those who don't have money
2	Supervisors are not held accountable
2	System favors incumbents
2	Candidates run in pack
2	Everything
2	Biggest vote getter is President of the Board
6	Other

Q10. What do you like least about the current system of electing Supervisors?

	Demo- crat	Repub- lican	Non- Partisan	Green	Cauc- asian	People of Color
Cost	33%	21%	8%	43%	29%	36%
Poor quality of supervisors	3	36	0	0	6	7
Lack of represen- tation	24	26	53	6	15	35
Business influence	6	0	0	29	10	0

#### Method for Drawing District Lines

All groups had a majority of respondents who preferred having a map plan specifying the boundaries of districts rather than a master's commission. Overall support of the map was 73%.

*Q11. If the Board of Supervisors agreed to put a district elections proposal on the ballot, would you be more inclined to vote for the proposal if the plan outlined stringent rules for drawing district lines which would be drawn later by a specific master's commission or the plan specified boundaries of each district with an accompanying map?*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Map	73%	77%	54%	82%	61%	71%	78%
Master's Commission	27	23	46	18	39	29	22

About two-thirds of respondents preferred giving more consideration to neighborhoods than to communities of interest when drawing district lines. Responses did not significantly differ by subgroup, however, slightly more Democrats and people of color chose "communities of interest."

*Q12. If lines are drawn to divide the city into districts, should more consideration be given to keeping together "communities of interest" or to keep together neighborhoods in a specific geographic area?*

	All	Democrats	Republicans	Non-Partisan	Green	Caucasian	People of Color
Neighborhoods in geographic area	63%	52%	71%	75%	69%	62%	54%
Communities of interest	37	48	29	25	31	38	46

### Most Important Task of Commission

Nearly all groups and the overall respondents believed the most important task of the Elections Task Force is to change the methods of electing supervisors. Republicans were the only group that did not make this their first choice. Republicans saw the most important duty of the Elections Task Force is to change the number of Supervisors (44%).

Q13. Which of the following duties of the Elections Task Force is *MOST* important to you?

	All	Demo- crats	Repub- licans	Non- Partisan	Green	Cau- casian	People of Color
Change methods electing super- visors	59%	62%	25%	50%	81%	56%	65%
Limiting costs of seeking election	22	17	25	50	19	19	27
Change the # of supervisors	10	7	44	0	0	12	5
Change the compensation for supervisors	9	14	6	0	0	14	3

## SAMPLE COMMENTS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

### What do you like best about the current system?

"Nothing."

"Unites the city in choosing its supervisors."

"Minority representatives seem to fare well."

"The staggered system so that no one faction takes control."

"Large choice of candidates."

"I am already familiar with it."

"The individuals."

"All supervisors perceive interest groups like the arts or lesbian/gay as constituents."

"My one vote counts as 5 or 6 votes in an election."

"Ability to dump Republicans."

"Supervisors are concerned with needs of entire city because of at-large system."

"The ability to have influence on all 11 supervisors."

"At large and term limits."

"Allows progressive coalitions."

"Seems to work."

"The board tends to reflect the progressive political atmosphere of the city."

"The two term limit."

"We vote on even years."

"I like it that Republicans never get elected. That might not be true with a system that gives more weight to minority opinions."

**What do you like least about the current system of electing supervisors?**

"It takes too much money to run."

"It elects too many nuts."

"No representation from Mission District."

"The rich buy votes."

"Eleven is too many supervisors for San Francisco."

"City-wide is very difficult for the candidates to effectively campaign."

"Little minority representation."

"Supervisors are influenced too much by business lobbyists."

"Supervisors pay is too low that it is not an economically viable option for working people to serve on the Board."

"No real district representation."

"Very hard or impossible to get minority representation."

"Most of the current incumbents."

"My vote may be of little importance since in city wide elections block voting can put supervisors in office despite not carrying many of the city's districts."

"The wasted votes when I find only one or two acceptable choices."

"Constant fundraising."

"The person receiving the most votes becomes head of the Board, not the most knowledgeable."

"The system does not work. The Board does not reflect the interests of various communities. It only reflects the interests of gays and progressives."

"Should be elected by district."

"Having to make campaign contributions."

"The amount of money that virtually gives outsiders no chance."

"I see no supes living in the Tenderloin, Hunters Point."

"The board seems not to reflect the diversity of the City."

"Flotsam rises to the top -- electing 2nd and 3rd (etc) vote getters."

"That we do not have district elections so candidates are forced to concentrate on all issues."

"Too many candidates to choose from."

"At large elections do not represent the people properly."

"Running as a pack prohibits targeted issue debates."

## FINAL RESULTS, n=186

1. Please refer to the descriptions of the alternative methods of electing members of the Board of Supervisors. Indicate below whether you fully support the idea, support the idea with reservations, or oppose the idea.

	<u>Support Fully</u>	<u>Support W/ Reserv.</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
a. Keep the current at-large system [n=172]	16	20	64
b. Have numbered seats at-large [n=162]	7	20	73
c. Limited voting [n=150]	4	35	61
d. Cumulative voting [n=159]	26	44	30
e. Preference voting [n=157]	40	29	31
f. District elections [n=169]	44	23	33
g. Mixed system [n=100]	33	28	39

2. Please indicate which of the above options are your first, second, and third choices for electing members of the Board of Supervisors?

	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>1st, 2nd or 3rd</u>
District elections	34%	12%	7%	53%
Preference voting	23	12	13	48
Current at-large	16	7	4	27
Mixed system	12	8	10	30
Cumulative voting	7	26	15	48
Numbered seats at large	5	12	2	19
Limited voting	1	7	9	17
No answer	3	16	39	

3. San Francisco currently has eleven Supervisors. All other counties in California have five, but San Francisco is the only consolidated City and County. Many cities have eleven council members. In the past, San Francisco had as many as 26 supervisors. Some people support the addition of more supervisors to adequately represent San Francisco's diverse population. Others feel San Francisco should have fewer supervisors to reduce the costs of government.

In your opinion, how many Supervisors should San Francisco have?

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS SF SHOULD HAVE: [n=172]

<u># of Supervisors</u>	<u>% Preferring</u>
5	4%
7	14
8	1
9	8
10	1
11	48
12	1
13	3
15	14
17	1
19	1
21	1
Over 21	4

Appendix A

Mean= 12  
Median= 11



4. The City Charter states that the position of Supervisor in San Francisco is a part-time and Supervisors are paid a salary of \$24,000 per year. The average salary for County Supervisors in San Francisco is about \$36,000. The average salary for county supervisors in the nine Bay Area counties is about \$44,000.

A. In your opinion, should the job of Supervisor be full-time or part-time? [n=182]

77	Full-time	23	Part-time
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B. What should be the salary of members of the Board of Supervisors?

SALARY:	Mean=	\$42,200
	Median=	\$44,000
	Under \$24,000=	4%
	\$24,000=	8
	\$25-30,000=	5
	\$35,000=	8
	\$36-39,000=	8
	\$40,000=	13
	\$44,000=	17
	\$45-49,000=	8
	\$50,000=	15
	\$51-60,000=	7
	More than \$60,000=	8

5. There is currently a limit of \$500 on the amount any one individual can contribute to a Supervisor's campaign for election. There is no limit on the amount of total contributions. Please indicate whether you support or oppose:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
a. Stricter limits on individual campaign contributions [n=179]	59	41
b. Limits on total campaign expenditures [n=183]	85	15
c. If you support stricter limits on individual campaign contributions, what the new limit be:		

INDIVIDUAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMIT: [n=106]

Mean=	\$248
Median=	\$200
Under \$100=	4%
\$100=	37
\$150-200=	11
\$250=	21
\$300-350=	7
\$500=	17
Over \$500=	4

- d If you support stricter limits on total campaign expenditures, what should the limit be?

TOTAL EXPENDITURE LIMIT: [n=124]

Mean=	\$155,000
Median=	100,000
Under \$50,000=	13%
\$50,000=	19
\$60-90,000=	7
\$100,000=	24
\$110-150,000=	11
\$175,000=	3
\$200,000=	8
\$250,000=	4
\$275-300,000=	2
\$500,000=	3
Over \$500,000=	5

6. Members of the Board of Supervisors are currently elected during even year elections. Before 1980, Supervisors were elected during odd year elections. Some observers note that even year elections generally have higher turnouts and greater participation by the voters but that local matters sometimes get more attention in odd year elections. When do you think we should elect Supervisors? [n=168]

60	Even-year	40	Odd-year
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7. Members of the Board of Supervisors are limited to two consecutive four year terms. Which of the following is your preference? [n=180]

54	Board members should be limited to two four-year terms
5	Board members should be limited to four two-year terms
6	Board members should serve one six-year term.
31	There should be no term limits on Board members
4	Other: _____

8. Supervisorial elections are staggered, meaning that in one cycle five Supervisors are elected and six Supervisors are elected in the next cycle two years later. In your opinion, should all Supervisors be elected in each election cycle, or should they be elected on a staggered basis? [n=180]

27	All in same cycle	73	Staggered
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9. What do you like about best about the current system of electing Supervisors? [n=106]

30%	Nothing
14	Staggered elections
10	Supervisors represent the entire city
6	Can vote for all eleven members
5	Individual supervisors are good
5	Ethnic minorities are represented on current board
4	Term limits
4	Supervisors take responsibility for citywide issues
2	Unites the City
2	Supervisors must take down campaign signs
2	Large choice of candidates
2	Can dump Republicans
14	Other

## Appendix A

10. What do you like least about the current system of electing Supervisors? [n=135]

- 27% Cost of campaigning
- 23 Lack of neighborhood representation/minority representation
- 7 Too much influence from business/corporations
- 7 Poor quality Supervisors
- 6 Difficult to campaign citywide/too big for grassroots campaigns
- 4 Lack of limits on campaign spending
- 4 Too many Supervisors/seats
- 2 Too many candidates
- 2 Only the rich can win elections
- 2 System ignores those who don't have money
- 2 Supervisors are not held accountable
- 2 System favors incumbents
- 2 Candidates run in pack
- 2 Everything
- 2 Biggest vote getter is President of the Board
- 6 Other

11. If the Board of Supervisors agreed to put a district elections proposal on the ballot, would you be more inclined to vote for the proposal if: [n=144]

- 27 The plan outlined stringent rules for drawing district lines, which would be drawn later by a specific masters' commission.
- 73 The plan specified the boundaries of each district with an accompanying map.

12. If lines are to be drawn to divide the city into districts, should more consideration be given to keeping together "communities of interest" (i.e. Major ethnic groups; labor, lesbians and gays; political parties, etc.), or to keep together neighborhoods in a specific geographic area? [n=163]

37 Communities of interest

63 Neighborhoods in a geographic areas

13. Which of the following duties of the Elections Task Force is MOST important to you: [n=163]

- 59 Changing the method in which we elect members of the Board of Supervisors
- 10 Changing the number of Supervisors
- 22 Limiting the costs associated with seeking election to the Board of Supervisors
- 9 Changing the compensation provided to the members of the Board of Supervisors

The following questions are optional:

Political Party Affiliation: [n=160]

- 62 Democrat
- 11 Republican
- 13 Non-partisan/decline to state
- 1 Libertarian
- 2 Peace & Freedom
- 1 American Independent
- 11 Green

Ethnic Background: [n=161]

- 68 Caucasian/White
- 6 Black/African-American
- 8 Latino/Hispanic
- 6 Chinese
- 1 Filipino
- 3 Japanese
- 0 Korean
- 0 Vietnamese
- 0 Other Asian/PI
- 1 Native American
- 5 Mixed Race
- 3 Other

Appendix A

# Politics

## Support growing for district elections

by Mary Ratcliff

"If we're going to increase participation, increase diversity, increase representation, then we've got to change our current system," said Gwenn Craig, chairwoman of the Elections Task Force formed in response to a proposition on last fall's ballot. She was quoted by the San Francisco Examiner, which also reported that an "unlikely alliance" of Republicans and Democrats wants the City's Supervisors to be elected by district, instead of the current at-large system. Republicans jumped over to the district elections side after last fall's defeat of San Francisco's one Republican Supervisor, Annemarie Conroy. She could have won in a friendly district, they reason.

After a round of meetings in the neighborhoods, including a meeting March 20 in Bayview Hunters Point, the task force has chosen four alternative election methods. To make winning a seat on the Board affordable and achievable for a candidate from Bayview Hunters Point, the best alternative appears to be district elections, which the task force has updated with "preference voting."

### POLITICS

## City Hall clean-up

### Hearings on district elections, campaign reform

**B**Y THE end of the year, San Francisco could be on its way to a return to district elections of supervisors.

The city hasn't had district elections since the days of Harvey Milk. But oddly enough, ethnic minority voters and the city's small Republican contingent are now on the same side in support of district elections as a series of public hearings is about to begin.

With the defeat of Annemarie Conroy last year, the city's conservative forces realized that the system of at-large elections puts them in the same boat as most ethnic minorities. This week a task force created by Proposition L, which was passed in the November elections, presented four proposals for election reform. The Board of Supervisors will consider these proposals and present voters with its choice in the form of a ballot initiative for this election.

The proposals include:

- Eleven at-large elections using "cumulative voting," which lets voters spread a certain number of personal votes over one or more candidates. For example, if there are six

candidates in a race, a voter can place all six votes on one candidate or distribute them among two, three, or more candidates.

- Creating five districts with three supervisors in each district elected through cumulative voting.
- Eleven district elections using "preference voting," which gives voters the opportunity to select first, second, and third choices. Candidates would have to surpass a minimum number of votes to win.

- Mixed elections with nine district-elected candidates and two at-large candidates. Under this scenario, during alternating election years there would be either four district candidates and one at-large candidate or five district and one at-large candidate.

The task force also proposes to increase supervisors' pay from the current \$24,000 a year to \$51,000, to impose stricter limits on campaign contributions, and to limit total campaign expenditures. The task force will hold public hearings on the proposals this month at the following locations:

**April 13:** Park Branch Library, 1833 Page, 6-9 p.m.

**April 18:** Chinese Cultural Foundation, 750 Kearny, 6-9 p.m.

**April 19:** Fort Mason Conference Center, Bldg. A, Marina at Buchanan Streets, 6-9 p.m.

**April 22:** Bernal Heights Community Foundation, 515 Cortland, 9 a.m.-noon. Sloat School Auditorium, 50 Darien Way, 2-5 p.m.

For more information, call the task force at (415) 554-5777.

# New ways to vote

An S.F. task force presents 4 new plans to choose supervisors, hoping to combine the best of district and citywide elections

ONE CONCLUSION reached so far by the Elections Task Force is that The City's current method of electing supervisors doesn't work and

ought to be replaced.

By what? The task force offers four scenarios, each with a number of moving parts, plus some side proposals.

Voters created the task force by passing Proposition L last November. Any change in the way San Franciscans elect supervisors would require passage of another ballot measure, probably this November.

After a series of public hearings this month, the task force will send its final recommendations to the Board of Supervisors. It's important that the public attend the hearings, learn about the options and debate their merits. (For more information, call the task force at 554-5777.)

Since 1980, San Francisco has elected its 11 supervisors "at large," meaning from the whole city. In 1977 and 1979, The City had a flirtation with district elections. Their death warrant was signed on Nov. 27, 1978, when District 9 Supervisor Dan White, about to lose his job, murdered District 5 Supervisor Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone.

Last fall, following considerable debate, this newspaper decided to endorse Prop. L because we believed the issue of how city supervisors are selected deserved a long, thoughtful look. After the election, we said, "If the task force arrives at a scheme that truly increases the responsiveness of the supervisors and makes the board more representative of all segments of The City, then it will have achieved its goal. If instead it simply pits the neighborhoods against downtown or seeks to recarve the political pie, then it will have failed."

Those still are the tests that ought to be applied to any plan.

In brief, here are the four proposals put forward by the Elections Task Force:

► *Preference voting:* In each of 11 dis-

tricts, voters would designate their first, second and third choices for supervisor from that district. If a voter's first choice didn't get enough votes for election, the vote would transfer to her second choice; if the second choice failed to get enough votes for election, the vote would transfer to her third choice. (If this sounds complicated, it is. We're told it's a snap for computers.)

► *Cumulative voting:* In at-large elections, each voter would have as many votes as supervisorial seats are up for election; a voter could divide her votes among candidates any way she wished, or give them all to one candidate.

► *District elections with cumulative voting:* The City would be divided into five districts, with three supervisors elected from each district through cumulative voting.

► *A mixed system of district and at-large elections:* The City would be divided into nine districts, each of which would elect one supervisor. In addition, two supervisors would be elected at large, city-wide.

EACH OF THESE systems has certain aims. Supervisors elected "at large" can focus on citywide problems. Supervisors elected by districts are presumably more accessible and more responsive. Preference voting seeks to minimize "wasted" votes, and could have the side effect of making campaigns less vicious. Cumulative voting allows minority constituencies (including The City's Republican Party) to concentrate their votes for a single candidate, and it encourages coalition-building.

The task force also recommends increasing supervisors' pay from \$24,000 a year to \$51,750 and holding supervisors' elections in odd-numbered, rather than even-numbered, years.


It's clear from talking to two members of the task force, Gwen Craig (who served as its leader) and Carmen White, that the group did its homework well. Now it's up to citizens to do theirs — and decide what system best serves the interests of all San Franciscans.

FEB 24 1995

# The fast track on elections

BY BRUCE PETTIT  
AND JIM WACHOB

How many members of the Board of Supervisors should there be? How much should they be paid? Should their



terms be limited? If so, should the limit be two four-year terms? Or four two-year terms? A single six-year term?

Should the present at-large elections be retained? Should the city return to district elections, or opt for a mix of district and at-large? How about numbered seats, so a challenger could target a specific incumbent, as is the case with judges?

Should we at least look at a Lani Guinier system that would give minorities a better chance of electing one of their own, instead of always being outvoted by majorities? Advocacy of adjusting one-person, one-vote orthodoxy doomed Guinier's bid to head President Clinton's Justice Department civil-rights division.

The nine members of an Elections Task Force wonder what San Francisco voters think about these issues. They have set forth on a furious three-week course beginning March 11: five widely scattered community meetings.

Why a furious pace? Proposition L of last November, which set up the task force, gave it a May 1 deadline to come up with one or several election plans. That way, the Board of Supervisors could receive the recommendations in plenty of time to hold its own hearings before submitting something — anything — for next November's ballot.



# HALL MONITORS: District elections

*continued from page 1*

To make its recommendation by May 1, the task force aims to have some plans roughly drafted by April 1. That way the public can have still a full month for reacting to those specific drafts before anything final goes to the supervisors.

The nine task force members mean to forestall any repeat of what happened last year with the advisory committee for City Charter revision. It spent too much time asking for public input — getting general, often abstract, comments. That left too little time for an actual draft that would have allowed the public to respond to something specific.

As a result, the public felt it had never been heard from. Everyone was for reform, but any concrete reform could invite countless opponents, and there was no time to compromise to satisfy a cross section. As a result, charter revision failed at the Board of Supervisors.

What is puzzling is why both charter revision, set in motion by a November 1993 vote, and elections revision now were given such a short time to recommend sweeping changes that would go to the heart of San Francisco government and politics.

Eight supervisors, led by Terence Hallinan, put elections review on the ballot last August just one week after charter revision collapsed. Calvin Welch, a community activist central to district elections' success in 1976 and failure in 1987, was critical of what he perceived as Hallinan's haste. Solicited for advice at a Febru-

ary 2 task force meeting, Welch recommended that elections revision aim not for this year's November 7 ballot, but the presidential primary ballot of March 1996.

If things get quickly complicated next month, the Welch recommendation might occur by default — regardless of Prop. L's mandate to aim for November 1995. After all, citizens called for a public charter revision vote in November 1994, and there were no consequences when it didn't happen. The sky didn't fall. There were no penalties on anybody. Now — maybe — a special supervisors' committee might agree on a new charter to submit for this November.

And you can expect things to get complicated in elections review. For instance, what if the task force discerns that the public wants to return to districts? The task force has hired David Binder to identify where all the communities of interest reside, so conceivably lines could be drawn by May 1.

But would even that be time enough for the public to comment on those specific lines? Jim Morales, who headed the failed 1987 effort for districts, told the task force February 2, "Line-drawing was the most politically charged activity I have ever done." Welch explained, "Politically active folks require an almost guarantee of an electoral outcome [from certain districts]. If you try [to accommodate them], you will go down a slippery slope. They say, 'We want our three seats, and don't care about the other eight districts.' The trust that existed in the 1970s dissipated by

1987."

All right, so don't draw lines, if that is a sure road to defeat. Just write a proposition that calls for districts, but line-drawing — by someone — later. But that can be just as sure a road to defeat. How many voters would buy what one activist described as "a pig in a poke?"

Furthermore, the task force has to be wondering now just how much of a ground swell is out there for any change at all. Prop. L had little publicity. It called for reform of the board, and, after years of ridicule, "reform" in the abstract was appealing, but even then appealing to a bare 52 percent.

Progressives, who championed district elections in the 1970s and 1980s, were able to sweep the citywide board election last year. Consultants, even progressive ones, like the big money that comes their way in citywide elections. Ironically, only conservatives and business types — who did away with districts in the summer of 1980 — even mention districts now, because they don't like the progressive sweep of last year.

However, for the regular task force meetings of February in the Civic Center, hardly anybody is showing — progressive or conservative. Task force members have to wonder how much turnout there will be at their special "community" meetings next month in the neighborhoods.

If there is little, the task force would be justified in telling the board, on May 1, that the city seems satisfied with the present system.



FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 1995

# 'Forcing' election thinking

BY BRUCE PETTIT  
AND JIM WACHOB

Nancy Lenvin, a member of the Elections Task Force, insisted last week that she was a "pragmatist" among her eight colleagues in recom-



mending a new method to elect San Francisco supervisors.

"I don't believe anything unusual will pass the electorate," she said. Regardless of San Francisco's liberal politics, "when it comes to changing basic infrastructure — police stations, Muni routes, or elections — San Francisco is incredibly conservative."

Nevertheless, Lenvin, like all of her colleagues, wants a new method and wants to see how the city will react to a variety of specific ideas.

The task force has until May 1 to recommend to the Board of Supervisors one or more election methods to place on the November ballot. The task force made a concerted outreach for public opinion in March. San Franciscans who did respond commented primarily on what they knew — at-large elections or district elections.

Capsule descriptions of other methods — cumulative, limited, and preference voting — were offered. Yet most of the public seemed to dismiss arguments that those other methods might produce a board more representative of the electorate.

Still, at least until it completes another round of neighborhood hearings in April, the task force is not giving up. "We have to force people to think about these different systems," said chair

Gwenn Craig. "I came here with a strong preference for district elections. We were not aware that perhaps there are better ways of achieving what we want."

Chris Bowman, the sole Republican member, summed up what the task force unanimously wanted: "We have a problem with [achieving adequate] diversity representation. Major voting blocs should feel they have an even hand."

Thus the task force is tentatively recommending four different election methods that it wants the public to consider this month.

The first alternative would increase the number of supervisors from 11 to 15. The city would be divided into five districts, with three supervisors elected from each. Three districts would have four-year-term elections one year; the two other districts would vote two years later. Cumulative voting would be in effect. Voters could cast a vote for three different candidates, two votes on one candidate and one on another, one-and-a-half votes for two candidates, or all three of their votes on one candidate.

A second alternative is to elect 11 supervisors, one from each of 11 districts. However, voters would rank up to three candidates according to their preference. Thus if their first choice were well short of what was needed for election, their first-choice vote would transfer to their second choice, or even their third.

A third alternative is a mixed system of two supervisors elected at-large citywide and nine elected from districts. There would be traditional voting (voters cast one vote each). Every two years, the city would elect a president of the board citywide, and either five or four district supervisors. Runoffs would be held if no candidate received a majority in the first election.

The fourth alternative would be citywide at-large elections for 11 supervisors, like the current system, except that votes could be cumulative. Voters could cast their five or six votes in an election in a variety of ways — all for separate candidates, all for one candidate, or for any other combination giving some candidates more than one vote.

Cumulative voting and preference voting are considered by proponents to be ways of helping minority viewpoints to gain representation in proportion to their voting power. Otherwise, it is argued, there is a tendency for majorities to always outvote minorities. Minorities, in this context, can be ethnic minorities, lesbian/gays, labor, Republicans, environmentalists, business, or any interest group less than a majority.

The task force is also tentatively recommending giving supervisors a salary of 15 percent higher than what their administrative aides receive. Currently that would mean a raise for supervisors from \$23,928 to \$51,750 a year. Suggestions to peg supervisorial salaries to a Bay Area average or to a percentage of judges' salaries were rejected, because that could give supervisors raises at a time when other city employee salaries are frozen.

The task force is expected to recommend that salaries be addressed in November in a charter amendment separate from election-method vote, so that one is not defeated because of the other. The job would also be designated as full-time, not part-time as it is currently. And supervisors would be expected to reject all speaking fees, gifts, and outside income.

Craig emphasized that these recommendations are by no means final. She encouraged citizens to attend any of six meetings this month to comment on the proposals. The first will be held Monday, 6 p.m., at the Ella Hill Hutch Community Center, 1050 McAllister Street.

Although few voters responded to requests for any open-ended suggestions in March, the task force hopes that the public will have more interest in responding to specific suggestions. The four suggestions have emerged from hours of task force compromises and a willingness to discover just how deep public feelings are for one system or another.

Dale Butler and Eric Mar were proponents of five districts electing three supervisors each. That method could encourage coalition building. Butler felt, and might frequently yield one liberal, one moderate, and one conservative from each district: "Each voter could claim their own representative out of the three."

Samson Wong said he saw a potential for cumulative voting and preference voting to produce more-representative results. But he nevertheless was recommending them with some reluctance. "It's hard enough to explain the current system to language minorities. To explain these new systems may be particularly difficult, especially preference voting."



## Compensation for the Board of Supervisors

This commission is also charged with the task of reviewing the compensation levels for the Board of Supervisors. Under current law, the Supervisors are paid on a *part-time* basis and earn a compensation level of \$1,994 per month, or \$23,928 per year.

Table 1 shows the history of compensation levels for the Board and changes in various indices of inflation (i.e. the Consumer Price Index). The table shows that the salary levels for the Board has not changed since 1982 yet price levels have changed by approximately 50 percent during this same time frame.

<b>Table 1</b> <b>Salary Levels and Consumer Price Index*</b> <b>San Francisco Board of Supervisors</b>					
Date	Monthly Salary	Annual Salary	Bay Area CPI**	CA CPI	US CPI
1932	\$ 200	\$ 2,400	n/a	n/a	n/a
1956	\$ 400	\$ 4,800	25.5	26.2	27.2
1964	\$ 800	\$ 9,600	30.2	31	31
1982	\$ 1,994	\$ 23,924	97.6	97.3	96.5
1993	\$1,994	\$23,924	146.3	149.4	144.5
Percent Change since 1982	0.0%	0.0%	49.9%	53.5%	49.7%

\*-Base year 1982-84=100

\*\*--Consumer Price Index, all urban consumers, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose

Sources: Salary data: Office of Supervisor Hallinan

CPI data: California Statistical Abstract

### Compensation Compared to Other Counties

Tables 2 and 3 show the compensation levels for California counties in the 1991-92 year. The data is based on a survey taken by the Alameda County Taxpayers Association.

Caveats in the Data. Comparing salary levels with other counties is not an exact science. The following caveats in the data are worth noting:

- San Francisco's 11 member Board of Supervisors is a combined city and county government-the only one in the state. All other counties in California have a five-member Board of Supervisors.

- the 1991-92 data is the most recent data available and is not adjusted for inflation. Thus, the actual compensation levels for the 1994-95 year may be somewhat higher.
- Some counties reported 1990-91 rather than the 1991-92 data. One county, Inyo did not participate in the survey.<sup>1</sup> There is no statewide data available on the current year's (i.e. 1994-95 fiscal year) salaries. In that sense, the salary data displayed in this table may be understated and not reflect actual current year salaries.
- This data does not indicate whether the Supervisors are paid on a full-time or part-time basis.
- The data does not indicate the variance in the duties and responsibilities of the Supervisors among the 58 counties.
- Nor does the data indicate the benefit levels for the Supervisors.

But to the best of our knowledge, this data represents the most recent information available on Supervisors' salaries. And it does serve as a useful starting point for analysis of this issue.

Table 2 shows that San Francisco's compensation level is relatively low compared to other counties in the state. In the 1991-92 year, San Francisco was the 10th largest county in the state. Its compensation level is the lowest among the ten largest counties. In fact the next largest county with a salary level lower than San Francisco's is Butte County (the 25th largest county in the state).

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<sup>1</sup> -Santa Clara County also did not participate in the survey. However, the Elections Task Force was able to receive compensation data for the 1991-92 year directly from Santa Clara County and the information was included for the purposes of this analysis.

**Table 2**  
**Salaries of Supervisors Ranked by Population**  
**1991-92 Year**

Rank	County	Population	Monthly Salary	Annual Salary
1	Los Angeles	9,003,500	\$ 8,274	\$ 99,288
2	San Diego	2,574,200	\$ 6,025	\$ 72,300
3	Orange	2,477,700	\$ 6,838	\$ 82,056
4	Santa Clara	1,516,000	\$ 6,045	\$ 72,540
5	San Bernardino	1,510,100	\$ 5,074	\$ 60,888
6	Alameda	1,298,900	\$ 3,782	\$ 45,384
7	Riverside	1,267,300	\$ 4,948	\$ 59,376
8	Sacramento	1,088,000	\$ 3,728	\$ 44,736
9	Contra Costa	827,100	\$ 3,814	\$ 45,768
10	San Francisco	724,200	\$ 1,994	\$ 23,928
11	Fresno	702,000	\$ 2,909	\$ 34,908
12	Ventura	680,300	\$ 4,168	\$ 50,016
13	San Mateo	663,400	\$ 4,627	\$ 55,524
14	Kern	572,700	\$ 5,276	\$ 63,312
15	San Joaquin	496,300	\$ 3,468	\$ 41,616
16	Sonoma	402,400	\$ 4,157	\$ 49,884
17	Stanislaus	388,200	\$ 2,382	\$ 28,584
18	Santa Barbara	375,900	\$ 4,143	\$ 49,716
19	Monterey	364,000	\$ 4,788	\$ 57,456
20	Solano	361,500	\$ 2,703	\$ 32,436
21	Tulare	325,000	\$ 2,689	\$ 32,268
22	Marin	235,000	\$ 3,317	\$ 39,804
23	Santa Cruz	230,400	\$ 4,096	\$ 49,152
24	San Luis Obispo	220,500	\$ 3,641	\$ 43,692
25	Butte	189,500	\$ 1,012	\$ 12,144
26	Merced	185,000	\$ 2,115	\$ 25,380
27	Placer	184,000	\$ 4,512	\$ 54,144
28	Shasta	156,300	\$ 2,896	\$ 34,752
29	Yolo	148,000	\$ 1,403	\$ 16,836
30	El Dorado	135,200	\$ 3,394	\$ 40,728
31	Humboldt	122,300	\$ 3,548	\$ 42,576
32	Imperial	114,900	\$ 3,935	\$ 47,220
33	Napa	113,400	\$ 2,753	\$ 33,036
34	Kings	105,900	\$ 4,137	\$ 49,644
35	Madera	95,400	\$ 1,843	\$ 22,116
36	Nevada	83,100	\$ 2,263	\$ 27,156
37	Mendocino	82,800	\$ 5,451	\$ 65,412
38	Sutter	68,000	\$ 1,585	\$ 19,020
39	Yuba	60,500	\$ 1,485	\$ 17,820
40	Lake	53,500	\$ 2,119	\$ 25,428
41	Tehama	52,200	\$ 1,340	\$ 16,080
42	Tuolumne	51,400	\$ 1,833	\$ 21,996

43 Siskiyou	44,700	\$	1,679	\$	20,148
44 San Benito	37,500	\$	1,675	\$	20,100
45 Calaveras	35,000	\$	1,879	\$	22,548
46 Amador	31,900	\$	1,922	\$	23,064
47 Lassen	28,600	\$	1,500	\$	18,000 **
48 Del Norte	27,000	\$	1,485	\$	17,820 **
49 Glenn	25,600	\$	1,441	\$	17,292
50 Plumas	20,400	\$	1,796	\$	21,552 **
51 Inyo	18,700		not reported		not reported
52 Colusa	16,900	\$	900	\$	10,800
53 Mariposa	15,400	\$	2,069	\$	24,828
54 Trinity	13,300	\$	1,610	\$	19,320
55 Mono	10,400	\$	1,734	\$	20,808
56 Modoc	9,900	\$	808	\$	9,696
57 Sierra	3,400	\$	1,025	\$	12,300
58 Alpine	1,200	\$	872	\$	10,464
<i>Average, all counties*</i>		\$	3,033	\$	36,398
<i>Average, 15 largest counties</i>		\$	5,914	\$	70,968
<i>Average, 9 Bay Area counties</i>		\$	3,697	\$	44,364

\*-does not include counties which did not report

\*\* -1990-91 figures

Note: For the purposes of this table, the Bay Area is defined as those counties who are members of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG): Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma

Source: Alameda County Taxpayers Association

The table also shows the average compensation levels for selected groups of counties. These data show that:

- the average salary level for all counties in California is \$3,033 per month, or \$36,396 per year. This average is 50 percent higher than San Francisco's compensation level.
- When compared to the 15 largest counties of the state, the average compensation level is \$5,914 per month, or \$70,968 per year. This average is 196 percent higher than San Francisco's compensation level. San Francisco was the 10th largest county in the state and had the lowest salary among these 15 counties.
- when compared to the nine Bay Area Counties<sup>2</sup>, the average compensation level is \$3,697 per month or \$44,364 per year. This average is 85 percent higher than San Francisco's compensation level. San Francisco was the 4th largest county in the Bay Area and had the lowest Bay Area salary.

Table 3 shows the same compensation level data, but ranked by monthly and annual salary rather than population. When the data is aggregated in this manner, it shows that San Francisco has the 36th largest salary of the 58 counties in the state.

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<sup>2</sup>-For the purposes of this analysis, the Bay Area counties are defined as those counties who are members of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG): Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma.



Table 3  
Ranking of Supervisors' Salaries  
1991-92 Year

Rank	County	Population	Monthly Salary	Annual Salary
1	Los Angeles	9,003,500	\$ 8,274	\$ 99,288
2	Orange	2,477,700	\$ 6,838	\$ 82,056
3	Santa Clara	1,516,000	\$ 6,045	\$ 72,540
4	San Diego	2,574,200	\$ 6,025	\$ 72,300
5	Mendocino	82,800	\$ 5,451	\$ 65,412
6	Kern	572,700	\$ 5,276	\$ 63,312
7	San Bernardino	1,510,100	\$ 5,074	\$ 60,888
8	Riverside	1,267,300	\$ 4,948	\$ 59,376
9	Monterey	364,000	\$ 4,788	\$ 57,456
10	San Mateo	663,400	\$ 4,627	\$ 55,524
11	Placer	184,000	\$ 4,512	\$ 54,144
12	Ventura	680,300	\$ 4,168	\$ 50,016
13	Sonoma	402,400	\$ 4,157	\$ 49,884
14	Santa Barbara	375,900	\$ 4,143	\$ 49,716
15	Kings	105,900	\$ 4,137	\$ 49,644
16	Santa Cruz	230,400	\$ 4,096	\$ 49,152
17	Imperial	114,900	\$ 3,935	\$ 47,220
18	Contra Costa	827,100	\$ 3,814	\$ 45,768
19	Alameda	1,298,900	\$ 3,782	\$ 45,384
20	Sacramento	1,088,000	\$ 3,728	\$ 44,736
21	San Luis Obispo	220,500	\$ 3,641	\$ 43,692
22	Humboldt	122,300	\$ 3,548	\$ 42,576
23	San Joaquin	496,300	\$ 3,468	\$ 41,616
24	El Dorado	135,200	\$ 3,394	\$ 40,728
25	Marin	235,000	\$ 3,317	\$ 39,804
26	Fresno	702,000	\$ 2,909	\$ 34,908
27	Shasta	156,300	\$ 2,896	\$ 34,752
28	Napa	113,400	\$ 2,753	\$ 33,036
29	Solano	361,500	\$ 2,703	\$ 32,436
30	Tulare	325,000	\$ 2,689	\$ 32,268
31	Stanislaus	388,200	\$ 2,382	\$ 28,584
32	Nevada	83,100	\$ 2,263	\$ 27,156
33	Lake	53,500	\$ 2,119	\$ 25,428
34	Merced	185,000	\$ 2,115	\$ 25,380
35	Mariposa	15,400	\$ 2,069	\$ 24,828
36	San Francisco	724,000	\$ 1,994	\$ 23,928
37	Amador	31,900	\$ 1,922	\$ 23,064
38	Calaveras	35,000	\$ 1,879	\$ 22,548
39	Madera	95,400	\$ 1,843	\$ 22,116
40	Tuolumne	51,400	\$ 1,833	\$ 21,996
41	Plumas	20,400	\$ 1,796	\$ 21,552 **

42 Mono	10,400	\$	1,734	\$	20,808
43 Siskiyou	44,700	\$	1,679	\$	20,148
44 San Benito	37,500	\$	1,675	\$	20,100
45 Trinity	13,300	\$	1,610	\$	19,320
46 Sutter	68,000	\$	1,585	\$	19,020
47 Lassen	28,600	\$	1,500	\$	18,000 **
48 Yuba	60,500	\$	1,485	\$	17,820
49 Del Norte	27,000	\$	1,485	\$	17,820 **
50 Glenn	25,600	\$	1,441	\$	17,292
51 Yolo	148,000	\$	1,403	\$	16,836
52 Tehama	52,200	\$	1,340	\$	16,080
53 Sierra	3,400	\$	1,025	\$	12,300
54 Butte	189,500	\$	1,012	\$	12,144
55 Colusa	16,900	\$	900	\$	10,800
56 Alpine	1,200	\$	872	\$	10,464
57 Modoc	9,900	\$	808	\$	9,696
58 Inyo	18,700		not reported		not reported
<b>Average, all counties*</b>		\$	<b>3,033</b>	\$	<b>36,396</b>
<b>Average, 15 largest counties</b>		\$	<b>5,914</b>	\$	<b>70,968</b>
<b>Average, 9 Bay Area counties</b>		\$	<b>3,697</b>	\$	<b>44,364</b>

\*-does not include counties which did not report

\*\*--1990-91 figures

Note: For the purposes of this table, the Bay Area is defined as those counties who are members of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG): Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma

Source: Alameda County Taxpayers Association

### Compensation Issues

In evaluating the appropriate level of compensation for the Board, the following issues need to be addressed:

1. should the Board be paid on a part-time or full-time basis;
2. if so, what should the method or the process by which compensation should be established;
3. what should the appropriate level of compensation be;
4. if the salary is full-time, should there be restrictions placed on outside income for Board members; and
5. should the compensation issue be a Charter amendment separate from, or included with, a Charter Amendment on the method by which Supervisors should be elected?
6. other issues in compensation.

1. Pay on a Full-Time vs. Part-Time Basis. As noted earlier, the City Charter specifies that Supervisors are part-time. The problems and issues faced by the Board of Supervisors are complex and demanding. The Elections Commission believes that the workload of the Board is sufficient to warrant the job to be a full-time occupation. This will enable the Supervisors to devote more time to the City's pressing issues and to be responsive to the demands made by their respective constituencies.

2. Process for establishing compensation levels. The last time compensation levels were adjusted for the Board of Supervisors was 13 years ago in 1982. Since that time, there has not been an adjustment, even for inflation.

Recently, many public and legislative officials have been reluctant to increase their own salaries in the face of slow economic recovery, public mistrust of government, and fiscal constraints. Setting salaries is also a complicated process in San Francisco. Currently, the City Charter adopted by the voters, sets the salary. This means that changes in compensation levels can be established only by a ballot measure.

The dilemma is that relatively low salary levels force the Supervisors' to look for outside income. This may make them more vulnerable to outside interests or it means that the Supervisor's job becomes available only to those who can afford it.

One alternative to this dilemma is to have an outside entity establish salary levels. For example, the state has an independent, seven member, Citizen's Compensation Commission to establish compensation levels for the legislature. The appointments are made by the Governor and must include compensation experts and representatives from labor, business, and nonprofit organizations. The Legislature does not have veto power over the Commission's decision. This process was established in Proposition 112, a statewide initiative adopted by the voters in 1988.

Locally, counties have chosen external (or exogenous) factors to establish salary levels. For example, Los Angeles County establishes Supervisors' salaries based on the *Superior Court Judges'* salaries (currently at \$104,262 per year<sup>3</sup>). In the City of Los Angeles, City Council

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<sup>3</sup> -as of January 1, 1994.

members receive a salary equivalent to the *Municipal Court Judges'* salary (currently at \$95,214 per year). Santa Clara County establishes Supervisors' salaries based on 80% of *Municipal Court Judges'* salaries (\$76,171 per year). The salaries of Municipal and Superior Court judges are set by the state, not the local governments and are uniform throughout the state. One concern, however, is that certain "inequities" may occur in using this method. Specifically, there could be years in which supervisors could receive a salary increase when in fact, the county employees will not receive and increase (and vice versa).

Another way to establish compensation levels is, after establishing an appropriate base level of compensation, to allow for automatic adjustments based on an agreed upon cost-of-living index such as the GNP State and Local Government Deflator or the Bay Area Consumer Price Index. This method would ensure that compensation levels offset the effects of inflation.

This, for example, could be done with the current levels of compensation for the Supervisors. As noted in Table 1, the compensation levels were last established in 1982. Since that time, inflation has eroded the Board's compensation level in terms of real dollars. Specifically, the Bay Area Consumer Price Index has increased 49.9 percent. Thus, to provide a compensation level equal to the 1982 buying power would require a compensation level of \$35,861.

3. Appropriate Levels of Compensation. What should the appropriate level of compensation be for a Supervisor in San Francisco?

The Elections Commission recommends adding 15% to the salary of the employee class to which their aides belong. In so doing, each supervisor would receive approximately \$51,750 per year for full-time work. The Supervisor's aides are, for purposes of salary and benefits, covered by the City's civil service system. Therefore, the Board of Supervisors, does not set their aides salaries directly and are compelled to vote either "yes" or "no" for the entire class of workers when the issue of salary adjustment is presented.

4. Restrictions on Outside Income. If the Board is paid on a full-time basis, should there be restrictions placed on outside income?

Other entities have chosen to place such restrictions. For example, the voters adopted Proposition 112, a statewide initiative put on the ballot and supported by the League of Women Voters of California, California Common Cause and the Chamber of Commerce. Proposition 112 (see attachment 1):

- banned honoraria for state elected officials.
- required the legislature to pass laws strictly limiting gifts. The implementing legislation limits gifts to \$250 per year per source.
- prohibits legislators from receiving income from a lobbyist or person with a state contract.
- prohibits legislators from lobbying the Legislature for one year after leaving office.
- established an independent salary commission to establish the salaries of the legislature. Currently, the salary is \$72,000 per year.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>-There is also a salary differential for certain officers of the Legislature. The Floor Leaders receive a salary of \$79,200 per year. The Speaker and Pro tempore of the Senate receive \$86,400 per year. These amounts are in addition to a per diem allowance of \$109 per day.

Los Angeles also adopted an Ethics Package for its County Council. The Council Members are to be paid as full-time public servants receiving a salary equal to Municipal Court Judges salaries (\$95,214 per year<sup>3</sup>). But the members are prohibited from all forms of outside income and there are restrictions on gifts (see attachment 2).

Recently, the Governor signed legislation which applies the honoraria ban and gifts limit to all locally elected officials. The legislation, however, does not restrict outside earned income nor does it prohibit post-government lobbying for one year.

At minimum, the Task Force believes that Supervisors should be held to standards similar to those established in Proposition 112. In no event would any of the "Proposition 112" provisions pre-empt (or dilute) stricter standards on ethics, gifts, conflict of interest rules already enforced by the City Charter or other laws/policies.

6. Separate Charter Amendment. Should the compensation issue be a Charter Amendment separate from, or included with, a Charter Amendment on the method by which Supervisors should be elected?

The Elections Task Force recommends that this proposal be placed as a Charter Amendment independent of the District Elections Charter Amendment. The issue of compensation for the Supervisors is a significant policy issue which should be debated and reviewed by the voters independent of the method by which supervisors should be elected.

#### 5. Other Considerations.

- When should the new compensation level take effect? Immediately following the adoption of the Charter amendment or after the next Supervisors election?
- Should there be a grandfather clause for incumbents who do not wish to take the new salary? The Los Angeles City Charter amendment gave incumbents the option of not taking the new salary (and as a result, they were not subject to the new restrictions on outside income). The new salary, however, was placed in effect for all elected officials following the departure of the incumbent (see LA City Charter amendment-section 65(a)(4)--i.e. attachment 2).
- Should there be a salary differential for the President of the Board of Supervisors?

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<sup>3</sup>-see footnote 3.

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE SPENDING AND AVERAGE SPENDING PER VOTES  
RECEIVED FOR SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES FOR SUPERVISOR, 1969-1994\*

Submitted by Elections Task Force Member, Chris Bowman

<u>Year</u>	<u>Successful Candidates</u>	<u>Average Spent</u>	<u>Average Cost/Vote</u>
<u>At Large</u>			
1994	5	\$319,119	\$3.15
1992	6	\$261,739	\$2.13
1990	5	\$238,547	\$2.78
1988	6	\$225,571	\$2.34
1986	5	\$255,221	\$2.34
1984	6	\$233,432	\$1.69
1982*			
1980	11	\$54,228	\$ .70
<u>District Elections with run-offs</u>			
1979	6	\$61,614	\$4.17
<u>District Elections without run-offs</u>			
1977	11	\$30,771	\$4.87
<u>At-Large</u>			
1975	6	\$46,273	\$ .46
1973	5	\$52,648	\$ .51
1971	6	\$69,397	\$ .55
1969	5	\$66,688	\$ .75

\* The Ethics Commission's campaign expenditure reports for 1982 are in storage at the War Memorial Building, thus 1982 data was excluded from this table.

COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES BY INCUMBENTS UNDER AT-LARGE AND  
DISTRICT ELECTIONS, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, AND 1980.

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Feinstein	\$61,055		\$55,253#2		
Barbagelata	\$50,749#1				
A. Nelder	\$57,644#1				
Tamaras	\$48,347#1				
V. Berold.	\$45,446#1				
Kopp		\$72,988	\$8,460		\$171,946
Molinari		\$61,337	\$65,817	\$44,105	\$68,358
Pelosi		\$37,492	\$37,795	\$87,095#5	
Mendelsohn		\$42,752#1			
B. Gonzalez		\$34,606	\$39,378	\$73,991#5	
Francois		\$28,465#1			
Lau			\$34,710	\$89,172#5	
Hutch			\$18,769		\$43,011
Milk			\$20,063#3		
Silver			\$29,979		\$24,261
White			\$20,144#4		
Dolson			\$8,121	\$61,461	\$20,495
Lawson			\$29,809	\$45,201	\$50,816
Britt				\$91,628	\$37,020
Ward				\$61,585	\$31,580
Walker				\$39,344	\$32,055
Bardis			\$28,883	\$87,822	\$40,569
Renne					\$106,597
Hongisto					\$33,094
W. Nelder					\$28,086

#1 Six At-Large Incumbents chose not to run for re-election under district-elections, some because they disagreed with the concept in principle, others because they felt they wouldn't win under the system.

#2 Dianne Feinstein became Mayor in 1978.

#3 Harvey Milk was assassinated in 1978 by Dan White.

#4 Dan White resigned from the Board in 1978.

#5 Gordon Lau, Bob Gonzalez, and Ron Pelosi were defeated in run-off elections in 1979, and chose not to run again at-large in 1980.

In summary, of the five at-large incumbents running for re-election under district elections in 1977, Feinstein and Kopp spent less money in 1977 than previously, and Molinari, Pelosi, and Bob Gonzalez spent marginally more than before. Of the six new Supervisors elected under district elections in 1977, three (Hutch, Milk, and White) spent less than Terry Francois spent in 1975, and three (Lau, Silver, and Lawson) spent more. With the advent

of run-off elections, all incumbents up for re-election (except for Molinari who was unopposed) spent much more money than they did in 1977, and four candidates (Pelosi, Bob Gonzalez, Gordon Lau, and John Bardis) spent more money than Quentin Kopp spent as top vote-getter in 1975. Finally, of the incumbent District Supervisors running at large in 1980, four (Kopp, Molinari, Hutch, and Lawson) spent more city-wide than they had in their Districts. Five others (Silver, Ward, Britt, Walker, and Bardis) spent less city-wide than they had in their Districts.

Put differently, the successful candidates for Supervisor in 1973 spent an average of \$52,648; in 1975, \$46,273; in 1977, under District Elections without run-offs, \$30,772; in 1977, under District Elections with run-offs, \$55,611; and in 1980, at large, successful candidates spent an average of \$54,228.

In conclusion, it appears that a candidate's propensity to raise contributions and spend monies continued unabated regardless of whether one ran city-wide or by district. The only difference was that the same resources were focused under district elections and the expenditures per voter increased 20 fold between 1975 and 1977, and dropped by 91% between 1979 and 1980. Indeed, even though there has been considerable inflation since 1979, per voter expenditures under district elections in 1979 for major candidates was 2.9 times as much as per voter expenditures under the at-large system in 1994.

Did this increased attention that voters received from candidates under district elections increase voter participation? Yes and no. The drop-off between those who cast ballots and who voted for a Supervisorial candidate in 1977 and 1979 was remarkably small -- approximately 5%, compared to the norm of 15% to 25% under recent at-large elections. On the other hand, overall turnout was down by 13.2% between November, 1973 and November, 1977 and by 5.0% between November, 1975 and November, 1979.



Campaign Contributions and Expenditures for Major Candidates  
for Supervisor, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992,  
and 1994

Submitted by Elections Task Force Member, Chris Bowman

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Contributions Includes Loans</u>	<u>Loans</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Cost/Vote</u>
<u>1994</u>				
Kevin Shelley	\$308,770	0	\$338,249	\$3.17
Carole Migden	\$397,048	\$3,500	\$396,935	\$3.73
Susan Leal	\$315,740	\$41,000	\$365,982	\$3.57
Tom Ammiano	\$127,498	0	\$127,280	\$1.31
Mabel Teng	\$363,160	\$35,000	\$362,149	\$3.93
			\$1,590,595	
Average			\$319,119	\$3.15
Annemarie Conroy	\$351,305	0	\$390,635	\$4.64
Bruce Quan	\$89,227	0	\$107,375	\$2.46
Sylvia Courtney*	\$104,279	\$28,800	\$103,279	\$2.50
Alicia Wang	\$66,379	\$4,600	\$62,179	\$1.75
Josh Newman**	\$8,744	\$1,678	\$8,639	\$1.46
Arthur Jackson	\$25,590	\$7,250	\$27,033	\$1.49
	\$2,157,740	\$121,828	\$2,289,735	
Average, Top Eleven Vote-getters			\$208,158	\$3.07
* ** Last campaign reports not on record with Registrar's Office.				
<u>1992</u>				
Angela Alioto	\$174,322	0	\$235,179	\$1.58
Sue Bierman	\$120,227	0	\$143,995	\$1.17
Tom Hsieh	\$432,949	\$95,000	\$426,532	\$3.62
Willie Kennedy	\$232,945	\$5,500	\$274,272	\$2.33
Barbara Kaufman	\$357,709	\$10,000	\$346,459	\$2.98
Terence Hallinan	\$122,254	\$38,500	\$143,995	\$1.26
			\$1,570,432	
Average			\$261,739	\$2.13
Jim Gonzalez	\$135,949	0	\$167,607	\$1.54
Cleve Jones	\$141,019	0	\$152,415	\$1.50
Jose Medina	\$47,334	\$500	\$59,698	\$1.68
Richard Hongisto	\$67,856	\$100	\$69,470	\$1.80
Manuel Rosales	\$41,369	0	\$37,387	\$1.95
	\$1,873,933	\$149,600	\$2,057,009	
Average, Top Eleven Vote-getters			\$187,001	\$1.77

1990

Doris Ward	\$146,781		\$156,887	\$1.57
Bill Maher	\$262,104		\$293,235	\$2.99
Carole Migden	\$251,119		\$247,685	\$2.92
R. Achtenberg	\$273,633		\$285,603	\$3.63
Kevin Shelley	\$204,722		\$209,324	\$3.12
			\$1,192,734	
Average			238,547	\$2.78

1988

Harry Britt	\$133,828		\$132,151	\$1.14
Angela Alioto	\$227,876	\$133,800	\$270,667	\$2.84
Tom Hsieh	\$364,043		\$406,003	\$4.36
Terence Hallinan	\$114,178	\$57,663	\$151,946	\$1.64
Willie Kennedy	\$126,732		\$210,432	\$2.32
Jim Gonzalez	\$182,083	\$1,500	\$182,225	\$2.05
			\$1,353,424	
Average			225,571	\$2.34

1986

Nancy Walker	\$215,772	\$1,000	\$224,458	\$1.81
Bill Maher	\$247,172		\$308,104	\$2.67
Richard Hongisto	\$310,979	\$120,000	\$327,864	\$2.99
Doris Ward	\$161,208	\$30,000	\$229,823	\$2.27
Wendy Nelder	\$103,334		\$185,857	\$1.98
			\$1,276,106	
Average			255,221	\$2.34

1984

John Molinari	\$308,159		\$375,538	\$2.52
Louise Renne	\$264,661		\$288,391	\$1.97
Quentin Kopp	\$327,607		\$325,986	\$2.34
Harry Britt	\$138,585		\$145,181	\$1.07
Willie Kennedy	\$141,278		\$159,489	\$1.20
Carol R. Silver	\$114,241		\$106,008	\$.84
			\$1,400,593	
Average			\$233,432	\$1.69

1980

Expenditures      Cost/Vote

Quentin Kopp	\$171,946	\$1.33
John Molinari	\$68,358	\$.57
Louise Renne	\$106,597	\$1.29
Carol Ruth Silver	\$24,261	\$.33
Ella Hill Hutch	\$43,011	\$.62
Harry Britt	\$37,020	\$.55
Nancy Walker	\$32,055	\$.48
Doris Ward	\$31,580	\$.48
Lee Dolson	\$20,495	\$.33
Richard Hongisto	\$33,094	\$.56
Wendy Nelder	\$28,086	\$.48
11 Winners	\$596,503	
Average	\$54,228	\$ .70
Terence Hallinan	\$30,030	\$ .52
Ed Lawson	\$50,816	\$.88
Don Horanzy	\$55,545	\$.99
Ben Hom	\$105,156	\$1.96
Haig Mardikian	\$50,077	\$1.01
Peter Finnegan	\$50,145	\$1.07
John Bardis	\$40,569	\$.94
David Scott	\$36,778	\$1.05
Robert Gonzalez	\$21,669	\$.64
Kevin Wadsworth	\$33,248	\$1.32
Bart Lee	\$40,824	\$4.55
	\$519,857	
Average, 12th - 22nd Highest Votegetters	\$47,260	\$1.08
43 Other Candidates	\$191,271	\$.57
Total, 65 Candidates	\$1,302,631	
Average	\$20,040	\$ .78

1979 (Includes November and Run-off Elections)

		<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Cost/Vote**</u>
<u>District 1:</u>	Ed Lawson	\$45,201	\$2.54
	Gordon Lau	\$89,172	\$5.70
<u>District 3:</u>	John Molinari*	\$44,105	\$6.34
<u>District 5:</u>	Harry Britt	\$91,628	\$5.07
	Terence Hallinan	\$62,766	\$4.14
	Kay Pachtner*	\$14,680	\$3.17
	Kevin Wadsworth*	\$38,397	\$10.94
<u>District 7:</u>	Doris Ward	\$61,585	\$7.54
	Robert Gonzalez	\$73,991	\$9.69
<u>District 9:</u>	Nancy Walker	\$39,344	\$2.37
	Lee Dolson	\$61,461	\$3.81
<u>District 11:</u>	John Bardis	\$87,822	\$4.18
	Ron Pelosi	\$87,095	\$4.92
6 Winning Candidates		\$369,685	\$4.17
7 Major Challengers/Incumbents		\$427,562	\$5.32
		\$797,247	\$4.71
22 Other Candidates		\$107,439	\$6.15
Total, 35 Candidates		\$904,686	\$5.18

\* Did not run in run-off.

\*\* Primary and Run-offs combined.

Note: Of the six candidates who won in 1979, collectively, they spent \$256,526 (for an average of \$42,754) in the Primary or \$6.43 per each vote received. The Five winning candidates who ran in a run-off, spent another \$113,159 or another \$2.32 per vote. Thus, collectively, the six winning candidates spent \$369,685 (for an average of \$61,614 or \$4.17 per each vote received in both races) or 33% more than the six winning candidates spent in 1975 at-large.

1977

		<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Cost/Vote</u>
<u>District 1:</u>	Gordon Lau	\$34,710	\$5.98
	Ed Lawson	\$22,603	\$5.38
<u>District 2:</u>	Dianne Feinstein	\$55,253	\$5.64
	Lester O'Shea	\$32,201	\$6.87
	Carol Mezey	\$30,368	\$7.49
<u>District 3:</u>	John Molinari	\$65,817	\$11.78
	John Kecker	\$41,819	\$9.63
<u>District 4:</u>	Ella Hill Hutch	\$18,769	\$4.74
	Paul Denning	\$17,505	\$5.20
	Barry King	\$25,699	\$16.67
<u>District 5:</u>	Harvey Milk	\$20,063	\$3.39
	Terence Hallinan	\$34,822	\$10.02
	Rick Stokes	\$56,237	\$19.30
	Bob St. Clair	\$13,807	\$4.94
<u>District 6:</u>	Carol Ruth Silver	\$29,979	\$7.10
	Gary Borvice	\$15,828	\$6.66
<u>District 7:</u>	Bob Gonzalez	\$39,378	\$14.99
	Victor Medearis	\$7,859	\$3.02
<u>District 8:</u>	Dan White	\$20,144	\$4.69
	Leonard Heinz	\$8,310	\$3.85
<u>District 9:</u>	Lee Dolson	\$8,121	\$1.84
	Bob Covington	\$20,893	\$5.91
<u>District 10:</u>	Quentin Kopp (Unopposed)	\$8,460	\$4.47
<u>District 11:</u>	Ron Pelosi	\$37,795	\$8.08
	John Bardis	\$28,883	\$7.56
Total, 11 Winning Candidates		\$338,489	\$4.87
14 Major Challengers		\$356,834	\$8.59
		\$695,323	\$6.03
87 Other Candidates		\$99,377	\$8.16
Total of 112 Candidates		\$1,094,700	\$6.66

Note: Of the eleven winning candidates, collectively, they spent \$338,489 (for an average of \$30,771) or \$4.87 per each vote received.

<u>1975</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Cost/Vote</u>
Quentin Kopp	\$72,988	\$.63
John Molinari	\$61,337	\$.56
Ron Pelosi	\$37,492	\$.36
Bob Mendelsohn	\$42,752	\$.41
Bob Gonzalez	\$34,606	\$.39
Terry Francois	\$28,465	\$.35
	<hr/> \$277,640	
Average	\$46,273	\$.46
Harvey Milk	\$10,096	\$.19
Joyce Ream	\$26,800	\$.53
Peter Mendelsohn	\$1,240	\$.03
Total, for top nine vote-getters	<hr/> \$315,776	\$.42
20 Other Candidates	38,931	\$.14
Total, 29 Candidates	<hr/> \$354,707	\$.34

<u>1973</u>		
Dianne Feinstein	\$61,055	
John Barbagelata	\$50,749	
Al Nelder	\$57,644	
Peter Tamaras	\$48,347	
Dorothy Von Beroldinger	\$45,446	
	<hr/> \$263,241	
Average	\$52,648	\$.51

<u>1971</u>		
Ron Pelosi	\$86,429	
Bob Mendelsohn	\$99,372	
Bob Gonzalez	\$54,054	
Terry Francois	\$67,620	
John Molinari	\$63,525	
Quentin Kopp	\$45,384	
	<hr/> \$416,384	
Average	\$69,397	\$.55

<u>1969</u>		
Dianne Feinstein	\$81,369	
Peter Tamaras	\$74,143	
Roger Boas	\$85,277	
John Barbagelata	\$33,330	
Dorothy Von Beroldinger	\$59,320	
	<hr/> \$333,439	
Average	\$66,688	\$.75



TURNOUT AND VOTES FOR WINNING CANDIDATES FOR SUPERVISOR  
IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1975-1994

November, 1994

% of Votes Cast

<u>Registered Voters</u>	450,649	
<u>Turnout</u>	249,669	55.40%


Kevin Shelley	106,791	42.77%
Carole Migden	106,417	42.62%
Susan Leal	102,442	41.03%
Tom Ammiano	97,230	38.94%
Mabel Teng	92,089	36.88%
Annemarie Conroy	84,169	33.71%
Bruce Quan	43,603	17.46%
Sylvia Courtney	41,376	16.57%
Alicia Wang	35,551	14.24%
Josh Newman	18,800	7.53%
Arthur Jackson	18,145	7.27%
Thomas Adams	14,351	5.75%
Maria Martinez	14,305	5.73%
Cesar Ascarrunz	14,128	5.66%
Wardell Fincher	13,492	5.40%
Joyce Jordan	10,775	4.32%
Norbert Nichols	10,367	4.15%
Della Johnson	10,317	4.13%
Jacquelyn Garrison	9,961	3.99%
Chuck Hollom	9,368	3.75%
Larry Victoria	8,137	3.26%
Phyllis Tolliver	6,097	2.44%
Ron Loftin	4,436	1.78%
Ellis Keyes	3,222	1.29%

November, 1992

<u>Registered Voters</u>	477,726	
<u>Turnout</u>	329,695	69.0%

Angela Alioto	148,940	45.18%
Sue Bierman	122,557	37.17%
Tom Hsieh	117,894	35.76%
Willie Kennedy	117,646	35.68%
Barbara Kaufman	116,354	35.29%
Terence Hallinan	114,525	34.74%
Jim Gonzalez	108,703	32.97%
Cleve Jones	101,827	30.89%
Jose Medina	88,022	26.70%
Richard Hongisto	86,377	26.20%
Manuel Rosales	39,515	11.99%
Other Candidates not listed.		





<u>November, 1990</u>		<u>% of Votes Cast</u>
<u>Registered Voters</u>	409,163	
<u>Turnout</u>	236,413	57.8%
Doris Ward	100,081	42.33%
Bill Maher	98,226	41.55%
Carole Migden	84,715	35.83%
Roberta Achtenberg	78,639	33.26%
Kevin Shelley	67,067	28.37%

November, 1988

<u>Registered Voters</u>	435,545	
<u>Turnout</u>	292,097	67.1%
Harry Britt	116,244	39.80%
Angela Alioto	95,271	32.62%
Tom Hsieh	93,075	31.86%
Terence Hallinan	92,793	31.77%
Willie Kennedy	90,545	31.00%
Jim Gonzalez	88,693	30.36%

November, 1986

<u>Registered Voters</u>	385,847	
<u>Turnout</u>	236,863	61.4%
Nancy Walker	123,999	52.35%
Bill Maher	115,163	48.62%
Richard Hongisto	109,684	46.30%
Doris Ward	101,439	42.83%
Wendy Nelder	94,039	39.70%

November, 1984

<u>Registered Voters</u>	424,091	
<u>Turnout</u>	298,517	70.4%
John Molinari	149,304	50.02%
Louise Renne	146,663	49.13%
Quentin Kopp	139,497	46.73%
Harry Britt	135,106	45.26%
Willie Kennedy	132,492	44.38%
Carol Ruth Silver	126,061	42.23%

November, 1982% of Votes CastRegistered Voters 377,069Turnout 238,991

63.4%

Wendy Nelder 106,575 44.59%

Richard Hongisto 104,304 43.64%

Doris Ward 99,234 41.52%

Nancy Walker 94,209 39.42%

Bill Maher 78,691 32.93%

November, 1980 (Eleven Seats up for Election)Registered Voters 407,982Turnout 268,070

65.7%

Quentin Kopp 129,619 48.35%

John Molinari 119,768 44.68%

Louise Renne 82,665 30.84%

Carol Ruth Silver 74,154 27.66%

Ella Hill Hutch 69,362 25.87%

Harry Britt 67,348 25.12%

Nancy Walker 66,454 24.80%

Doris Ward 65,610 24.47%

Lee Dolson 62,322 23.25%

Richard Hongisto 59,355 22.14%

Wendy Nelder 58,345 21.76%

December, 1979 Run-off% of Citywide Vote

<u>Registered Voters</u>	378,232	
<u>Turnout, Citywide</u>	196,341	51.91%

District 1

<u>Registered Voters</u>	35,545	
<u>Turnout</u>	19,958	56.15%

Ed Lawson	10,482	54.25%	5.34%
Gordon Lau	8,838	45.75%	
Total	19,320		

District 5

<u>Registered Voters</u>	46,922	
<u>Turnout</u>	22,857	48.71%

Harry Britt	11,842	54.17%	6.03%
Terence Hallinan	10,019	45.83%	
Total	21,861		

District 7

<u>Registered Voters</u>	24,277	
<u>Turnout</u>	11,411	47.00%

Doris Ward	5,599	52.13%	2.85%
Robert Gonzalez	5,142	47.87%	
Total	10,741		

District 9

<u>Registered Voters</u>	34,068	
<u>Turnout</u>	18,679	54.83%

Nancy Walker	9,530	53.40%	4.85%
Lee Dolson	8,315	46.60%	
Total	17,845		

District 11

<u>Registered Voters</u>	38,132	
<u>Turnout</u>	21,568	56.56%

John Bardis	11,345	55.10%	5.78%
Ron Pelosi	9,248	44.90%	
Total	20,593		

November, 1979

% of Citywide Vote

<u>Registered Voters</u>	372,061	
<u>Turnout, Citywide</u>	204,869	55.06%

District 1

<u>Registered Voters</u>	34,927	
<u>Turnout</u>	20,027	
Ed Lawson	7,310	39.56%
Gordon Lau	6,805	36.83%
<u>Others</u>	<u>4,363</u>	23.61%
Total	18,478	

District 3

<u>Registered Voters</u>	27,243		
<u>Turnout</u>	13,884		
John Molinari (unopposed)	6,961	100.00%	3.40%

District 5

<u>Registered Voters</u>	46,075	
<u>Turnout</u>	24,388	
Harry Britt	6,245	27.03%
Terence Hallinan	5,152	22.30%
Kay Patchner	4,631	20.05%
Kevin Wadsworth	3,540	15.32%
<u>Others</u>	<u>3,533</u>	15.29%
Total	23,101	

District 7

<u>Registered Voters</u>	23,533	
<u>Turnout</u>	11,963	
Doris Ward	2,564	24.41%
Jim Gonzalez	2,494	23.74%
<u>Others</u>	<u>5,447</u>	51.85%
Total	10,505	

District 9

<u>Registered Voters</u>	33,540	
<u>Turnout</u>	18,960	
Lee Dolson	7,803	46.37%
Nancy Walker	7,171	42.61%
<u>Others</u>	<u>1,855</u>	11.02%
Total	16,829	

District 11

Registered Voters      37,736  
Turnout                      22,297

John Bardis	9,670	47.50%
Ron Pelosi	8,438	41.45%
<u>Others</u>	<u>2,248</u>	<u>11.04%</u>
Total	20,356	

November, 1977

<u>Registered Voters</u>	339,306		
<u>Turnout, Citywide</u>	175,582	51.75%	

District 1

<u>Registered Voters</u>	33,579		
<u>Turnout</u>	17,391	51.79%	
Gordon Lau	5,804	35.10%	3.31%
Ed Lawson	4,205	25.43%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>6,526</u>	39.47%	
Total	16,535		

District 2

<u>Registered Voters</u>	38,557		
<u>Turnout</u>	19,453	50.45%	
Dianne Feinstein	9,791	51.75%	5.58%
Lester O'Shea	4,690	24.79%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>4,439</u>	23.46%	
Total	18,920		

District 3

<u>Registered Voters</u>	25,322		
<u>Turnout</u>	12,674	50.05%	
John Molinari	5,587	46.11%	3.18%
John Keker	4,341	35.83%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>2,188</u>	18.06%	
Total	12,116		

District 4

<u>Registered Voters</u>	28,532		
<u>Turnout</u>	12,272	43.01%	
Ella Hill Hutch	3,958	35.64%	2.25%
Paul Denning	3,365	30.30%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>3,781</u>	34.05%	
Total	11,104		

District 5

<u>Registered Voters</u>	40,201		
<u>Turnout</u>	20,142	50.10%	
Harvey Milk	5,925	30.56%	3.37%
Terence Hallinan	3,476	17.93%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>9,984</u>	51.50%	
Total	19,385		

District 6

<u>Registered Voters</u>	23,659		
<u>Turnout</u>	11,184	47.27%	
Carol Ruth Silver	4,225	40.88%	2.40%
Gary Borvice	2,376	22.99%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>3,735</u>	36.14%	
Total	10,336		

District 7

<u>Registered Voters</u>	20,019		
<u>Turnout</u>	9,804	48.97%	
Robert Gonzalez	2,627	29.52%	1.50%
Victor Medearis	2,604	29.27%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>3,667</u>	41.21%	
Total	8,898		

District 8

<u>Registered Voters</u>	26,503		
<u>Turnout</u>	15,036	56.73%	
Dan White	4,296	30.46%	2.45%
Leonard Heinz	2,158	15.30%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>7,648</u>	54.23%	
Total	14,102		

District 9

<u>Registered Voters</u>	30,273		
<u>Turnout</u>	16,018	52.91%	
Lee Dolson	4,415	29.43%	
Bob Covington	3,537	23.58%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>7,049</u>	46.99%	
Total	15,001		

District 10


<u>Registered Voters</u>	37,545		
<u>Turnout</u>	22,517	59.97%	
Quentin Kopp (unopposed)	18,118	100.00%	10.32%



District 11

<u>Registered Voters</u>	35,116		
<u>Turnout</u>	19,091	54.37%	
Paul Pelosi	4,679	25.61%	2.66%
John Bardis	3,818	20.90%	
<u>Others</u>	<u>9,774</u>	53.49%	
Total	18,271		

# Voter Turnout In San Francisco



## A Report of the Elections Task Force

March 10, 1995

### Introduction

This is a guide to the work of the Elections Task Force. In November, 1994, San Francisco voters passed Proposition L, which created an Elections Task Force. This citizens committee is charged with reporting to the Board of Supervisors on May 1, 1995.

The Elections Task Force can suggest retention of the current election system or recommend modification. The charge of the group is to review the costs associated with seeking election to the Board of Supervisors, the effect on the legislative process of establishing geographical districts within the City, the most appropriate number of supervisorial seats, and the compensation provided to the members of the Board of Supervisors. The Elections Task Force is further responsible for reviewing whether the current system effectively represents the diversity of the City's neighborhoods and communities.

### How it works now:

The Board of Supervisors is a legislative body that proposes laws, puts measures on the ballot for voters to vote on and reviews the Mayor's budget. They can propose laws to raise or reduce taxes. They propose legislation which is referred to the Mayor who can sign it into law or veto it. The Board of Supervisors can override a veto with enough votes. Supervisors are assisted by 1 administrative aide and 1 legislative aide.

There are 11 members of the Board of Supervisors.

They are elected "at-large" which means that all voters can vote for the number of open seats.

Members run for office in "staggered" terms- five or six are elected in "even" numbered years for four year terms.

Members are subject to "term limits" and can serve only two consecutive terms.

Currently, it takes about 90,000 votes to be elected (or a total of about 30% of the total votes cast.)

They earn about \$24,000 each year for what is technically considered a "part-time" job although some have other part-time jobs.

Winners of supervisorial seats have spent \$200,000- 400,000 or \$4 per vote to run.

There is currently a limit of \$500 on the amount that an individual or organization can contribute to a Supervisor's campaign for election. Currently there are no limits on the total amount of money that can be spent on campaigns.

The Elections Task Force has also reviewed several ways that San Franciscans could determine who is elected to the Board of Supervisors:

*Current "at-large" system*

*Numbered seats*

*District elections*

*Mixed system of district elections/ at-large*

The Elections Task Force has reviewed several ways of voting for members of the Board of Supervisors:

*Limited Voting*

*Cumulative Voting*

*Preference Voting*

Please note: This is a working document which shows the work of the Elections Task Force. It does not reflect the personal views of Elections Task Force members or the group as a whole.

The following pages explain how these systems work.

## *Voting Systems*

### At Large (current system)

Voters vote for up to first five choices.

Voter 1	Voter 2	Voter 3	Voter 4	Voter 5
<b>Lincoln</b> Lin Roosevelt Kahlo Garcia	Lin Roosevelt Kahlo Garcia Johnson	Roosevelt Franklin Quincy Kahlo Brown	Franklin Quincy Kahlo Roosevelt Brown	Quincy Kahlo Sanger Lin Brown

Totals (winners in bold)

<b>Lin</b>	<b>3</b>
Roosevelt	4
Quincy	3
Kahlo	5
Brown	3
Johnson	1

Lincoln	1
Franklin	2
Garcia	2
Sanger	1

### Discussion:

This is the current system of electing members of the Board of Supervisors. Candidates with the most votes win.

\*Supporters say that it ensures that Supervisors must represent the whole City, not just a particular community or neighborhood.

\*Opponents say that it is expensive to run for Supervisor in this system, and that it does not provide for neighborhood representation. Opponents also say that it is difficult for ethnic and political minority constituencies to get elected.

## Numbered Seats At-large

Each Supervisor would fill a particular seat that is numbered and each candidate would declare which seat they were running for. Seats would be numbered so voters would choose between groupings of candidates.

### Voter Directions:

Each voter can vote for five Supervisors but must choose one for each seat. (i.e. Lin or Roosevelt or Sinatra: Quincy or Kahlo or Wong, etc..)

Ballots would look like this:

<u>Seat 1</u>	<u>Seat 2</u>	<u>Seat 3</u>	<u>Seat 4</u>	<u>Seat 5</u>
Lim	Quincy	Jefferson	Garcia	Quixote
Roosevelt	Kahlo	Brown	Sexton	Smith
Sinatra	Wong			

Winner of the most votes for each seat wins.

### Discussion:


This is similar to the at-large system currently used in San Francisco. However, instead of all candidates running in a pack with the top five or six winning election, the Board seats are contested on a seat by seat basis. Voters have as many votes as there are open seats. This system is used in Seattle, Washington. Run-off elections could be necessary should a majority (50% + 1) be required and more than two candidates are running.

\*Supporters of this system say that this system makes elected officials more accountable.

\*Opponents of this system say that it limits choice and could increase negative campaigns.

## District Elections:

San Francisco would be divided into districts and voters would vote for candidates who represent their geographical area. In this example, voters living in the shaded area must choose one of a field: Garcia, Sexton, or Mandela. They cannot vote for candidates in other areas.



## Discussion:

This system was in use in San Francisco between 1977 and 1979. In 1977, candidates with the most votes won, however, a run-off was needed in 1979 to win a seat. Thus, in 1977 a candidate needed only 2600 votes to win but needed 5600 to win two years later. In 1980, district elections was repealed and elections were moved to even-numbered years. This system is in use in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago.

In this system, members of the Board of Supervisors are elected from a geographic area or "district", as opposed to the entire City. San Francisco would be divided into a discrete number of similar population size areas and members of the Board would run and represent that district. Only registered voters living in the in the area of the district are eligible to vote in that district's election and each voter has one vote for their district representative.

\*Supporters of this system say that it would increase neighborhood representation at City Hall. Depending upon how lines are drawn, this system could increase ethnic voting power. Supporters also say that it is less expensive to run for office.

\*Opponents say that in this system no one pays attention to the city-wide needs of San Francisco. Voters vote only for one representative under this system not for 11 (under the current system). Opponents also say that some groups may not be represented in this system (environmentalists, etc..) Opponents also say that it could pit communities against each other.


### Mixed: District & At Large

This system combines aspects of district elections with the current at-large system. Some supervisors would be elected by district while others would be elected city wide. For example, the City might be divided into four districts. Residents of each of these districts would vote for one representative from "their" district AND vote for a specified number of candidates who would represent the city as a whole.

Voters vote for one person  
from their district

Voters vote also for a  
specified number  
from the whole city

AND



### Discussion:

This system is used in Tacoma, WA and Boston, MA.

- \* Supporters say that a mixed system allows for both a neighborhood and city-wide perspective to be represented.
- \* Opponents say that one system (district or city-wide) is better. Opponents also say that large districts would do little to represent minority interests and at-large races would not help increase ethnic or minority political representation.

## *Voting Systems*

### Limited Voting

Voter directions:

There are 5 open seats but voters may only vote for two candidates.

<u>Voter 1</u>	<u>Voter 2</u>	<u>Voter 3</u>	<u>Voter 4</u>	<u>Voter 5</u>	<u>Voter 6</u>
Lincoln	Milk	Kahlo	Kahlo	Smith	Roosevelt
Milk	Lincoln	Smith	Churchill	Roosevelt	Cayou

Results: (winners marked in bold):

Lincoln	<b>2</b>
Milk	<b>2</b>
Kahlo	<b>2</b>
Smith	<b>2</b>
Roosevelt	<b>2</b>
Churchill	1
Cayou	1

#### Discussion:

Voters cast fewer votes than the number of seats being elected. For example, in a race to elect five candidates, voters might be given 1 or 2 votes. This system is identical to an at-large system except that the total number of votes are limited, thus each vote gains more weight. The five candidates with the most votes win. Limited voting is used in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, PA and Hartford, CT.

This system could not be used in district elections.

\* Supporters say that the vote is "limited" providing greater opportunities for maximizing the vote of minority constituencies. Supporters also say that it would be less expensive to run for office than the current system.

\* Opponents say that voters should have a chance to vote on all candidates (i.e. voters should have as many votes as there are seats available.) Also, because it is a majority "winner-take-all" system, it may limit diversity.



## Cumulative voting

Voter directions: You have 5 votes, and they may be cast all for one candidate or for each of five candidates or some combination.

<u>Voter 1</u>	<u>Voter 2</u>	<u>Voter 3</u>	<u>Voter 4</u>	<u>Voter 5</u>	<u>Voter 6</u>
Kahlo 5	Lincoln 2 Franklin 3	Franklin 1 Smith 3 Milk 1	Jackson 1 Milk 1 Lim 1 Hepburn 1 Mandela 1	Kahlo 2 Lincoln 3	Kahlo 3 Milk 2

Winners (in bold):

<b>Kahlo</b>	5 + 2 + 3 = 10
<b>Lincoln</b>	2 + 3 = 5
<b>Franklin</b>	3 + 1 = 4
<b>Milk</b>	1 + 2 + 2 = 5
Smith	3
Jackson	2
Hepburn	1
Lim	1
Mandela	1

### Discussion:

Voters can cast as many votes as there are seats, but voters can "cumulate" their votes on favorite candidates. In a race to elect five seats, a voter could cast all five votes for one candidate, one vote for five candidates or some combination in between. The five candidates with the most votes wins. This system is used in Peoria, IL, Chilton County, AL and Alamagordo, NM. This system is favored by Professor Lani Guinier, a specialist in the Voting Rights Act.

\* Supporters say that this system allows people to show their strong support for a candidate. Supporters also say that this system forces coalition building. Others say that it ensures that those who feel strongly about a particular candidate can have their candidates elected.

\* Opponents say voters could "waste" five votes on a candidate who does not win. Also, a small minority could target a candidate and sway an election. Other opponents say that this system could allow a candidate to win with a very small voter base, thus giving undue weight to a particular voting ideology.

## Preference Voting

Voter Directions: Rank candidates by putting a number next to the candidate's name (1, 2, 3, 4...) If a voters top choice loses, their vote transfers to the second choice, then third, or until their vote helps elect someone.

<u>Voter 1</u>	<u>Voter 2</u>	<u>Voter 3</u>	<u>Voter 4</u>	<u>Voter 5... (etc...)</u>	<u>Voter 32</u>	<u>Results</u> <u>1st Ballot</u>
Kahlo 6	Kahlo 3	Kahlo 5	Kahlo 3	Kahlo 6	Kahlo 3	Kahlo 8
Mann 5	Mann 2	Mann 2	Mann 4	Mann 4	Mann 4	Mann 6
Smith 1	Smith 4	Smith 1	Smith 1	Smith 5	Smith	Smith 3
Clint 3	Clint	Clint	Clint 2	Clint 2	Clint	Clint 5
Dole 2	Dole	Dole	Dole 5	Dole	Dole 2	Dole 4
Garcia 7	Garcia 5	Garcia 4	Garcia 6	Garcia 3	Garcia 1	Garcia 4
Lum 4	Lum 1	Lum 3	Lum 7	Lum 1	Lum	Lum 2

In this example there are 32 voters and four seats to fill. Eight votes win a seat ( $8 \times 4 = 32$ ). Kahlo is elected with eight first choice votes. Lum has the least number of votes and is eliminated. Voters 2 and 5 who listed Lum as their first choice have their vote transferred to their second choice, Mann (Voter 2) and Clint (Voter 5).

### First Transfer Results

Kahlo 8 (elected)  
Mann 7  
Smith 3  
Clint 6  
Dole 4  
Garcia 4  
Lum eliminated

*After the first transfer, no more candidates have reached 8 votes. Smith has the least number of votes, so Smith is eliminated. Voters 1, 3, and 4 who listed Smith as their first choice have their vote transferred to their 2nd choice, Dole (Voter 1), Mann (Voter 3) and Clint (Voter 4).*

### Second Transfer Results

Kahlo 8 (elected)  
Mann 8 (elected)  
Clint 7  
Dole 5  
Garcia 4  
Lum, Smith eliminated

*Mann is elected with eight votes. Garcia has the lowest number of votes, so Garcia is eliminated. Voters 32, 10, 11 and 12 (Voters 10, 11, 12 not shown in example) who listed Garcia as their first choice have their votes transferred to their second choice, Dole (Voters 32, 10 and 11) and Clint (Voter 12).*

### Third Transfer Results

Kahlo 8 (elected)  
Mann 8 (elected)  
Clint 8 (elected)  
Dole 8 (elected)  
Garcia, Lum & Smith eliminated

*Election is over. Kahlo, Mann, Clint and Dole have eight votes and are declared winners.*

### Discussion:

Voters rank in order of preference (1, 2, 3, 4...) If a voters top choice loses, their vote transfers to the second choice on the ballot and keeps on transferring until their vote helps elect someone. The winning threshold is the number of open seats divided into the total number of votes. Preference voting is used in Cambridge, MA, New York City boards of education and some foreign countries.

- \* Supporters say preference voting wastes very few votes and gives representation to majority and minority viewpoints since it is a form of proportional representation.
- \* Opponents say that this is confusing.

For Immediate Release  
28 February 1995

For further information:  
Margie O'Driscoll  
415-554-5777

## Community Meeting Advisory

In November 1994, San Francisco voters approved Proposition L, which created an Elections Task Force. This citizens committee is charged with presenting a report on the Election of Supervisors to the Board of Supervisors on May 1, 1995.

The Elections Task Force can suggest retention of the current system or recommend modifications, for example, district elections or numbered seats. The charge of the group is to review the costs associated with seeking election to the Board of Supervisors, the effect on the legislative process of establishing geographical districts within the City, the most appropriate number of supervisorial seats, and the compensation provided to the members of the Board of Supervisors. The Elections Task Force is further responsible for reviewing whether the current system effectively represents the diversity of the City's neighborhoods and communities.

Committee members include: Ramon Arias, Dale Shimasaki and Carmen White (appointed by Germaine Q Wong); Samson Wong, Chris Bowman and Nancy Lenvin (appointed by the Mayor) and Gwenn Craig, Dale Butler and Eric Mar (appointed by the Board of Supervisors). Germaine Q Wong, Registrar of Voters serves as an ex-officio member.

### Community meeting schedule:

Saturday, March 11th, 1-4 PM Yik Wo Alternative School, 2245 Jones St.  
MUNI: 30 Stockton

Tuesday, March 14th, 6-9 PM\* Roosevelt Middle School, Rm. 101, Presidio and Arguello  
MUNI: 38 Geary

Monday, March 20th, 6-9 PM\* Southeast Community Facility, 1800 Oakdale Ave.  
MUNI: 23 Monterey or 44 O'Shaunessy

Tuesday, March 21st, 6-9 PM\* Knuth Hall, SF State University, 1600 Holloway  
MUNI: M streetcar

Saturday, March 25th, 1-4 PM New College Theater, 777 Valencia  
MUNI: 14 Mission or 16th St. BART

Please plan to arrive by 8:00 PM if you wish to speak.

The Elections Task Force meets every Thursday night from 6-9 PM at 1660 Mission St., #2001. If you have other questions, please call 554-5777. The office is located at 633 Folsom St., San Francisco, CA 94107 (FAX: 554-7344)

## PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM THE ELECTIONS TASK FORCE

### INTRODUCTION

This report is from the Elections Task Force. It contains four proposed alternative methods for electing San Francisco's Board of Supervisors and recommendations regarding salaries for members of the Board of Supervisors, election cycles, and election costs. It is the Task Force's preliminary response to its charge, contained in Proposition L (passed by the voters the November, 1994 election) to "prepare one or more plans . . . to provide the people of the City and County of San Francisco with a fair and adequate method of electing members of the board of supervisors."

The Task Force is seeking public input regarding these matters to assist it in formulating its final recommendations to the Board of Supervisors which must be presented by May 1, 1995.

The summary of the four proposals is contained in the chart on page 2. Each of the proposals and tentative recommendations is then more fully described on pages 3 to 7. A brief Appendix is provided which contains additional data on various issues.

The proposals and recommendations are the result of information gathered by the Task Force during its regular weekly meetings, analysis of written materials on the subject of election reform, and the first series of five community hearings held by it in March, 1995. To determine which of the proposals or other modifications would best meet the needs and expectations of the citizens of San Francisco, the Task Force is holding a second series of six community meetings (see last page for schedule and locations) during the first three weeks of April and is seeking written comments. In evaluating the current system or any of the proposals or any modifications desired to those proposals, particular references to comments on the following would be helpful: (1) impact on neighborhood representation; (2) impact on representing political, social and racial minority interests; (3) impact on the cost of being elected; (4) impact on the legislative process; (5) the most appropriate number of supervisors and (6) the compensation to be paid to supervisors.

Members of the Elections Task Force are: Nancy Lenvin, Christopher Bowman and Samson Wong (appointed by the Mayor); Gwenn Craig, Dale Butler and Eric Mar (appointed by the Board of Supervisors); Carmen White, Dale Shimasaki and Ramon Arias (appointed by the Registrar of Voters); and Germaine Q. Wong, Registrar of Voters, ex officio.

Written comments which may be sent to: Elections Task Force, 633 Folsom, #109, San Francisco, CA 94107, but must be received on or before April 22, 1995. For further information, phone 554-5777.

## COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS

	<u>11 At Large</u>	<u>11 District</u>	<u>9 District 2 At-Large</u>	<u>5 District 3 in each</u>
Total # of members	11	11	11	15
Winners per district	NA	1	1	3
# elected per election cycle	5 or 6	5 or 6	5 or 6	6 or 9
Type of voting system	cumulative	preference	current	cumulative
# of voter choices	up to 5 or 6	1st, 2nd, & 3rd choices*	1 district & 1 at-large	up to 3
Run-off election if no one gets 50%?	no	yes	yes	no
Board Pres. elected by:	board elects	board elects	voters elect	board elects
Size of District (pop.)	NA	66,000	80,000	145,00

\*Voters in each district would vote for Supervisors every 4 years.

## CURRENT SYSTEM AND TASK FORCE PROPOSALS

### THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The Board of Supervisors is San Francisco's legislative body that proposes laws and adopts the City's budget.

There are 11 members of the Board of Supervisors.

They are elected "at-large" which means they are elected city-wide rather than by districts. In addition, each voter has the same number of votes as the number of seats to be filled, but may not give more than one vote for each candidate. The voter may vote for fewer than the number of seats to be filled, but may not vote for more.

Since 1980, elections have been in even numbered years. Prior to 1980, elections for the Board of Supervisors were held in odd numbered years.

Each Board member serves for a term of four years and may only serve two consecutive terms (i.e., "term limits").

The 11 members of the Board are not all elected at the same time and their terms are therefore "staggered." Five are elected in one election and six are elected in the following election, etc.

In an election, the five or six candidates who receive the most votes are elected. There are no run-offs. Successful candidates usually receive a plurality of votes (between 28% to 39%) rather than a majority of the votes cast.

In each election, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes becomes the President of the Board of Supervisors and serves for two years until the next election when the highest vote getter becomes the Board's president.

The job of being a supervisor is considered to be part-time. Currently, each supervisor earns approximately \$24,000.

Supervisors are assisted by two aides who work full time. The administrative Assistant receives \$41,000 a year; the Legislative Aide receives \$45,000 a year.

## THE PROPOSALS

### **SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS ELECTED BY PREFERENCE VOTING**

("District Elections" with "Preference Voting")

**DESCRIPTION:** San Francisco would be divided into 11 districts containing approximately the same number of people and each district would elect one member of the Board of Supervisors. Voting within each district would be accomplished using the "preference voting" method which is also referred to as a single transferable vote.

#### **PARTICULARS:**

**Term:** Remain at four years.

**Election Cycle:** Staggered every two years. In each election, 5 or 6 of the districts would hold elections for supervisor.

**Size of District:** Using 1990 census data, each district would contain approximately 66,000 people. The districts will be created which are geographically compact, recognize natural geographic boundaries, optimize the voting power of ethnic, political, social and economic minorities, and keep neighborhoods intact. No district lines have been drawn and no formal plan as to how to draw them has been adopted.

**Necessity for Run Off:** Yes. Winning candidate must receive a majority (50% plus 1) of the votes cast.

**Board President:** Would be elected by fellow Supervisors.

**Who Votes:** Only registered voters living in the district may vote for a Supervisor from that district.

**VOTING METHOD—Preference Voting:** On each ballot, a voters will designate his/her 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice. See below for how votes are counted. Only if no candidate receives a majority of votes after all first, second, and third choices are counted would there be a run-off, which would therefore be unlikely to occur.

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** Neighborhoods are directly represented in district elections. Candidates running in a district can focus campaigns in a defined geographic area. District constituents may have greater opportunities to interact and influence candidates and their elected representative. Political minorities have a better chance at being both elected and represented under a district system. Preference voting reduces "wasted" votes.

**NOTES ON HOW VOTES ARE COUNTED UNDER PREFERENCE VOTING:** All first choice votes are counted. If no candidate receives a majority of votes, the candidate who received the least number of votes, would be eliminated. All voters who listed this candidate as their first choice would have their vote transferred to their second choice. If these transferred votes failed to qualify a winner, the candidate who finished second-to last would be eliminated and all voters who listed this candidate as their first choice would have their vote transferred to their second choice. This would continue until one candidate receives 50% plus 1 of the votes or the ballots are exhausted, in which case, a run off would be held.



## 11 SUPERVISORS ELECTED AT LARGE WITH CUMULATIVE VOTING

(Current "At Large" but with "Cumulative Voting")

**DESCRIPTION:** 11 Supervisors would be elected by all voters (i.e., at large) using cumulative voting.

### PARTICULARS:

**Term:** The term of the Supervisors would remain at four years. **Election Cycle:** The terms of the Supervisors would be staggered as in the present system with 5 being elected at one election and 6 at the following election.

**Size of District:** There would be no districts.

**Necessity for Run Off:** None would be required since the five or six highest vote getters would be elected as is the case in the present system.

**Board President:** The Board members themselves would elect the President of the Board who would serve for two years until the next election of supervisors.

**Who Votes:** Each registered voter has the number of votes as there are seats to be filled on the Board of Supervisors and may vote in each election.

**VOTING METHOD—Cumulative Voting:** This proposal recommends cumulative voting. In voting, each voter would have the same number of votes as the number of seats to be filled in the election but, with the cumulative voting system, the voter could give all of his or her 5 or 6 votes to one candidate or divide the votes among candidates any way the voter wishes (EXAMPLES: 2 votes for A, 2 votes for B and 1 vote for C OR 3 votes for A and 2 for B OR 1 vote for A, 1 vote for B, 1 vote for C and 2 votes for D). Cumulative voting is being used in several cities in Illinois, one in Alabama, one in New Mexico, and at least one in Maryland.

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** The "at large" system will better serve the needs of the entire city. It allows supervisors to focus on city-wide problems (such as the budget) and balance the provision of city-wide services such as police, fire, libraries, etc. Cumulative voting is designed to combat the problem of the at large, highest vote getters "take all" elections which usually result in the largest interest group or a coalition of interest groups (which may not be a numerical majority) winning all or most of the vacant seats. Instituting cumulative voting will allow minority constituencies to concentrate their votes in order to elect candidates to represent their interests, thus creating a more diverse Board of Supervisors. It is a system that has been selected by courts in voting rights cases to insure minority representation on legislative bodies where the minority communities are disbursed throughout a locality and are not grouped into a definable geographic district.



## FIVE DISTRICTS WITH 3 SUPERVISORS EACH, ELECTED WITH CUMULATIVE VOTING

("The 5 - 3 With Cumulative Voting")

**DESCRIPTION:** The City will be divided into 5 districts of about 145,000 people each. Each district will have three Supervisors.

### PARTICULARS:

**Term:** Each supervisor will serve for four years.

**Election Cycle:** Elections will be staggered by district so that two districts will elect six supervisors (3 in each district) in one election and three districts will elect nine supervisors (3 in each district) in the following election. Every supervisor within a district will be elected at the same time.

**Size of District:** Based on 1990 census data, each district will have approximately 145,000 people. The districts will be created which are geographically compact and recognize geographic boundaries, optimize the voting power of ethnic, political, social and economic minorities, and keep neighborhoods intact to the extent possible. No lines for the districts have been proposed by the Task Force nor has there been a proposal about how the lines would be drawn if this alternative were adopted.

**Necessity for Run Off:** No requirement for a run off is included. The three Supervisors who receive the most votes will be elected.

**Board President:** The Board of Supervisors will select their President to serve for two years until there is another election in the other districts.

**Who Votes:** Each voter will only vote for representatives from the district in which the voter resides.

**VOTING METHOD—Cumulative voting within each district:** Cumulative voting is proposed within each district. In voting, each voter would have the same number of votes as the number of seats to be filled in the election but, with the cumulative voting system, the voter could give all of his 3 votes to one candidate or divide the votes among candidates any way the voter wishes (EXAMPLES: 2 votes for A, 1 vote for B vote OR 3 votes for A OR 1 vote for A, 1 vote for B, and 1 vote for C).

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** Supervisors will be accountable to specific communities and neighborhoods, but the larger district will help insure a city-wide perspective. Residents in each district will have access to three representatives. The cumulative voting system within the district should encourage coalition building among groups, thereby probably resulting in major groups within each district being able to elect a representative and promote a more diverse Board of Supervisors. The larger number of supervisors in each district affords each voter more access to his/her representative on the Board.

## MIXED SYSTEM COMPRISED OF 9 DISTRICTS AND 2 AT LARGE

(The 9 - 2 System with traditional voting)

**DESCRIPTION:** San Francisco would be divided into 9 districts containing approximately the same number of people and each district would elect one person to the Board of Supervisors. In addition, there would two supervisors elected at large, city-wide.

### PARTICULARS:

**Term:** Terms of Supervisors would remain at four years.

**Election Cycle:** Elections would be held every two years as with the present system. Terms would remain staggered which means that as to the districts, in one election, 4 or 5 of the districts would hold elections for Supervisor and the others would not. The at large supervisor's terms would also be staggered so that only one at large supervisor would be elected in each election.

**Size of District:** Approximately 80,000 people.

**Necessity for Run Off:** Run offs would be used if no candidate received a majority (50% plus 1) of the votes cast in either the district or the at large election.

**Board President:** The supervisor elected at large would serve as President of the Board. This individual would in essence not only be running for the office of supervisor, but also for President of the Board.

**Who Votes:** Each voter will vote for one district representative and both at large supervisors. In one election cycle, if the voter resides in a district scheduled to have an election, that voter will vote for a representative from his/her district and for one at large candidate. If the voter resides in a district that is not having a district election, the voter will only vote for the city wide supervisor.

**VOTING METHOD—**Traditional majority (50% plus 1) voting: The voting method in both the districts and in the city-wide election would be identical to the method used at present, i.e. each voter would have one vote only. If no candidate received a majority of votes, then a run off would be held between the two highest vote getters.

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** The proposal combines elements of both the district and at large systems. Neighborhood and minority constituencies will have a direct representative and the district supervisors will be accountable to voters within a defined district. In addition, there will be two supervisors elected city wide who will have a city wide perspective and serve in the most powerful position on the Board. The traditional voting system is known and is perceived to be more readily useable by minority populations who, because of language barriers, have low voter turnout when ballots or voting procedures are too complicated.

## COMPENSATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

**PROPOSAL:** Recognize that being a member of the Board of Supervisors is a full time job and establish a compensation rate based on that recognition. Proposed compensation would be 15% higher than that of the highest paid aide to the Supervisors. Members of the Board of Supervisors would be subject to various outside income limitations and subject to conflict of interest prohibitions.

**BACKGROUND:** The Board of Supervisors are currently paid on a part-time basis and earn \$23,928 per year. At current salary levels, adding 15% to the salary of the employee class to which the aides belong, each supervisor would receive \$51,750 per year for full time work.

The Supervisor's aides are, for purposes of salary and benefits, covered by the City's civil service system. They are paid as part of a larger group of similarly classed workers subject to the civil service system. Therefore, the Board of Supervisors, does not set their aides salaries directly and are compelled to vote either "yes" or "no" for the entire class of workers when the issue of salary adjustment is presented.

### COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS (1991-1992 data):

In all 58 California counties, compensation for the members of Boards of Supervisors averaged, \$39,396 per year.

In the 9 Bay Area counties, the average compensation was \$44,364 (San Francisco was the 4th largest county yet had the lowest Bay Area salary)

In California's 15 largest counties, the average salary was \$70,968 per year

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** The job of supervisor is in fact a full time job. Payment of a reasonable full time salary would allow many more people to run for the Board who otherwise would be discouraged, because of financial constraints. If a reasonable salary were paid, it would then be possible to restrict other employment and limit outside income. At the level proposed, such limitations would probably be similar to those contained in the statewide initiative Proposition 112, which restricts or prohibits honoraria, gifts, compensation from lobbyists and restrictions on the ability to lobby other agencies. In addition, there would be strict conflict of interest prohibitions both during the supervisor's term and for a limited period thereafter. No existing prohibition would be weakened or diluted by this proposal.

**SEPARATE CHARTER AMENDMENT:** It is recommended that the issue of salary and level of compensation be placed in a separate charter amendment and not included with a proposal to elect the supervisors in a different manner. Strong reaction against either proposal should not affect the other.

## ELECTION OF SUPERVISORS—IN ODD OR EVEN ELECTION YEARS?

**PROPOSAL:** The election of the members of the Board of Supervisors should be held in odd-numbered years rather than in the even years as is the current practice.

**BACKGROUND:** Until 1980, members of the Board of Supervisors were elected in elections held in odd numbered years. Thereafter, the elections were switched to even numbered years. The President of the U.S. and the Governor of California are elected in even years and their campaigns tend to increase the number of people who vote in those elections. In fact, data examined showed that voter turnout for November elections is far higher in even years, when a President or Governor is elected, than in odd years when a Mayor is elected. The data also shows that since 1979, the last year San Franciscans voted for Supervisors at the same time as voting for Mayor, there has been a decline in the voter turnout for the Mayor's election.

The physical ballot during even year elections is much longer than in odd years. The order of placement on the local ballot is mandated by State and Federal laws which result in the voting for members of the Board of Supervisors to be near the bottom of the ballot. Many of those voting for President or Governor do not vote for Supervisor.

Since 1980 the high turnout has been 179,546 (1989) and the low 107,920 (1985), while during the 1970's the high was 202,237 (1973) and the low 175,582 (1977). Arguably, the election of the members of the Board of Supervisors increased voter turnout during the 1970's.

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** Despite the data showing increased numbers of voters in even years, the Task Force generally believed that, with an election reform in the manner of electing supervisors, there would be increased interest in the office and therefore more people would vote. In addition, given the length and complexity of ballots in even years and the attention paid to the gubernatorial or presidential candidates, local elections do not receive the attention they merit. Electing all local officials together in years where there are not presidential or gubernatorial campaigns, would allow the voters the opportunity to study local issues and become acquainted with the candidates for the Board of Supervisors.

## **COST OF ELECTIONS AND CAMPAIGN REFORM EFFORTS**

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** To continue efforts to maintain campaign contribution limits and regulate the amount of money which a candidate may spend on an election. If a district election system were implemented, the current limit on spending recently adopted by the Board of Supervisors by ordinance should be reduced.

**BACKGROUND:** The cost of running for office has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years. In 1980, the successful candidates for Supervisor (under the at large system) spent an average of \$54,228 to get elected, or \$.70 per vote. In 1992, the six successful candidates for Supervisor spent an average of \$261,739 to get elected or \$2.13 for every vote received.

In the campaigns to institute district elections around 1977 and before, one of the key points made by supporters of the district election system was that it would reduce the cost of getting supervisors elected. Experience demonstrated, however, that the amount spent by each candidate was similar to that spent by candidates in the at large elections. In fact, probably because of the necessity for run-offs, in the 1979 election, the average expenditure of successful candidates was \$61,614.

**REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION:** Given the history of expenditures between at large and district elections and the fact that the cost of running for the Board of Supervisors now ranges between \$175,000 and \$350,000, the Task Force believed that no system alone could control and reduce the cost of running a successful election campaign. In addition, the Task Force was concerned that the pervasive role of money to elect Supervisors undermines public confidence on the issues of accessibility, accountability, and conflicts of interest.

## APPENDIX

### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE TASK FORCE

#### Introduction

On November 8, 1994, San Francisco voters passed Proposition L, which created a 9-member elections Task Force to determine a better way to elect the Board of Supervisors. Prop. L defined the duties of the Task Force as follows:

The elections task force shall prepare one or more plans, in the form of proposed charter amendments, that will provide the people of the City and County of San Francisco with a fair and adequate method of electing members of the board of supervisors to represent the People of the City and County. In preparing these plans, the task force shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the costs associated with seeking election to the board of supervisors, effective representation of the diversity of the City's neighborhoods and communities, the effect on the legislative process of establishing geographical districts within the City, the most appropriate number of supervisorial seats and the compensation provided to the members of the board of supervisors. The task force, in fulfilling this duty, shall consult with the Registrar of Voters. In order that the Board of Supervisors may present a charter amendment to voters on this issue at the November 1995 election, the Elections Task Force shall present its plans to the Board of Supervisors no later than May 1, 1995.

#### Actions of the Committee

The Elections Task Force held weekly meetings and discussed voting systems with leading academics and community activists. A questionnaire was developed and sent to over 1300 community organizations and individuals, asking their opinions on the charges of the task force. A series of 5 community meetings were held (in Chinatown, Sunset, Richmond, Mission and Bayview/Hunters Point) to solicit community input. Advertisements about these meetings were placed in El Mensajero, Sun Reporter and Sing Tao. Press releases were sent to community papers and the major newspapers. The San Francisco Independent printed a list of community meetings. The questionnaire was translated into Spanish and Chinese. In addition, the Elections Task Force also held weekly meetings, to which the public was invited to express their opinions.

Detailed information on the workings of the Task Force can be found in the minutes of its weekly meetings. This paper summarizes the steps that led to the development of the proposals the Task Force submitted to the Board of Supervisors.

#### Administration and Work of the Task Force

Prop. L allotted \$25,000 for the work of the Task Force. With this money, the Task Force hired local pollster David Binder to provide demographic and statistical data



to the group, and Margie O'Driscoll to act as Task Force staff. An elections Task Force office and telephone were provided by the office of the Registrar of Voters.

The Task Force went about its work systematically. It researched the number and salaries of supervisors in other counties and cities in California. The Task Force invited MALDEF (Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund), the Asian Law Caucus, and the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) to present their views and concerns relevant to election of supervisors. In spite of repeated requests, none of these organizations were able to send a representative to address the group. The Task Force identified four electoral systems that could be applied to San Francisco: the current at-large system, numbered seats (modified at-large), district elections, or a mixed system (some districts/some at-large).

The Task Force also researched alternative voting systems that have been instituted in cities throughout the United States in response to Voting Rights Act lawsuits. Most elections in the United States are winner-take-all that do not give weight to second or third choices. Minority voting blocks, no matter how large, are ignored under this system. The alternative to winner-take-all voting is proportional representation. Limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting are forms of proportional representation that can be used in nonpartisan elections. They are all forms of proportional representation that give more weight to a minority vote, in contrast to our winner-take-all system.

The group divided its tasks into topics for discussion at its weekly meetings. During the March 16 meeting, the Task Force discussed whether elections should be held in even or odd years and whether supervisors should be elected all at once or in staggered terms. The March 23 meeting focused on campaign finance reform and final report format. The March 30 meeting and a special April 2 meeting were devoted primarily to electoral systems and draft proposals. The April 2 meeting also dealt with supervisorial salary and number of supervisors. By the April 6 meeting, the Task Force had four draft proposals to present to the public.

#### Research/Presentations

Before developing proposals, the Task Force sought information on the Voting Rights Act, what electoral systems are used in other cities, and with what affects, and the City's own electoral history. At the Task Force's February 2nd meeting, Calvin Welch and Jim Morales, former members of San Franciscans for District Elections, presented a history of district elections in San Francisco, 1970-1994. From 1977 to 1980 San Francisco supervisors were elected by districts. In 1980 district elections of supervisors was repealed and elections were returned to at-large.

At the February 9th meeting, Steven Hill, Regional Director of the Center for Voting and Democracy, discussed non-partisan forms of proportional representation voting: limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting (also called single transferrable vote). Under limited voting, the voter has fewer votes than there are open seats. Under cumulative voting, the voter can place all his votes on one candidate. Under preference voting, the voter ranks his vote in order of preference (1, 2, 3) and if his first choice loses, his vote transfers to his second choice. All of these systems

mitigate majority rule. On February 23, Joe Diaz, who was Deputy Counsel to the New York City Districting Commission, gave a presentation on the NYC redistricting effort, which increased the number of districts from 35 to 51.

Also at the Feb. 23 meeting, Randy Riddle from the City Attorney's Office provided information on the Voting Rights Act. Mr. Riddle noted that the Voting Rights Act does not give specific instructions on how to achieve its goal of "equality of opportunity electorally." The Voting Rights Act includes race, color, and language in its definition of ethnicity. District elections could be considered unlawful if they diluted minority effectiveness in voting power. In order to prove vote dilution, a group must prove that they are sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, and that they are politically cohesive; and that the white majority votes enough as a block to defeat minority candidates.

On March 2nd, Professor of Political Science, Richard DeLeon, of San Francisco State University, addressed the Task Force. He urged the Task Force to look beyond at-large or district elections of supervisors. He discussed alternative voting systems, like cumulative and limited voting, and presented a set of questions for the task force to consider as it develops its proposals. He closed with a request to be sure to study the effects of whatever proposal is finally implemented.

#### Public Outreach

One of the first concerns of the task force was to be sure members of the public had ample opportunities to comment on the work of the task force. Two series of public meetings were planned, one to receive public input into the drafting of proposals, and another for public review of the proposals once they were drafted. In addition, the task force prepared a questionnaire that was mailed to over 1000 civic organizations in San Francisco on Feb. 25. This mailing included the schedule of public meetings as well as a reminder of the task force's weekly meetings. On Feb. 22, press releases of the meetings were sent out to local media, including neighborhood, ethnic, and gay/lesbian press. Paid advertisements were placed in Sing Tao, El Mensajero, and the Sun Reporter. Translators were hired for the meetings, and the questionnaire was translated into Chinese and Spanish.





## PREFERENCE VOTING

### A Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution

*Richard L. Engstrom*

#### Expanding our Understanding of Electoral Alternatives

The American experience with election systems has been seriously constrained by a narrow notion of how voters should be allowed to express, through their ballots, their preferences among candidates. With rare exceptions, American voters in this country are permitted to cast as many votes as there are unfilled positions in any particular election contest. However, they are restricted to casting only a single vote in any given contest, without their vote designating any intensity or order of preference among the candidates. This notion, which most Americans accept uncritically, is far from a requisite for democratic elections. Indeed, it is not the way the franchise is operated in most democratic countries.

The concept of casting a single vote per election contest has shaped the framework for debate in the United States concerning the best way to structure electoral competitions. As a consequence, electoral reform debates have been confined to a very restricted range of election system options, ignoring a variety of other equally, if not more, democratic election systems based on different rules governing ballot casting.

In recent years, however, controversies over American election systems have extended debate beyond this narrow framework to include the consideration of other democratic voting rules. Some local governmental jurisdictions have even adopted election systems based on rules other than one vote per election contest. This expansion in thinking about conducting democratic elections has been stimulated primarily by racial and non-English speaking minority demands for a full and effective franchise -- a franchise that is not diluted by the manner in which electoral competition is arranged.

#### Reasons to Look Beyond Single-Member Districts

For many years, virtually the only electoral scheme viewed by voting rights litigators as a remedy for vote dilution was a set of single-member districts, fairly drawn from the minority perspective. This scheme not only remedied unfairly drawn single-member districts, but it provided the solution to vote dilution caused by submergence in multi-member (including at-large)

districts. Voting rights proponents have now expanded their consideration of remedial options, however, to include "modified multi-seat" election systems. In modified multi-seat election system, elections can be held in a multi-member (even at-large) format, without a systematic dilution of a politically cohesive minority group's voting strength. The key to these modified multi-seat arrangements is a change in the rules concerning how the franchise operates. These changes in the voting rules satisfy the basic requirement of treating each voter equally. However, the changes provide minority groups with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice within the multi-seat format, even if voting is polarized along group lines. These changes in voting rules can cleanse the multi-seat format of its dilutive tendency.

There are several reasons why voting rights advocates have become attentive to these alternative systems. The major reason is that, in some settings, single-member districts will not provide an effective remedy for dilution because of the residential dispersion of minority voters. Majority-minority districts that satisfy the "one person, one vote" criterion sometimes simply cannot be created.

In addition, challenges to the at-large election of state and local trial court judges have promoted consideration of multi-seat election options that are nondilutive but keep judges electorally accountable to all of the voters residing within the primary geographical jurisdiction of their court. Some voting rights advocates like Lani Guinier have even criticized the majority-minority, single-member district as a form of political re-segregation that results in token representation rather than empowerment.

#### The Advantages of Preference Voting

The modified multi-seat election systems that have received the most attention to date are limited voting and cumulative voting. These systems have recently been adopted, in response to vote dilution allegations, by a number of local governments.

Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to another modified multi-seat system called preference voting (also called the single transferable

vote). This oversight is unfortunate because preference voting (PV) is a medium more conducive to intra-minority competition than either limited or cumulative voting. Under PV, as long as minority voters share a preference for a set of candidates, there can be competition among those candidates for minority voter support without that internal competition precluding the election of one or more of them. PV in effect offers minority voters, as well as other cohesive groups of voters, the equivalent of a primary election and a runoff or general election in single ballot.

The allocation of a single vote to every voter under PV theoretically provides minority voters with same relative voting strength as in a one-vote limited or cumulative system. Yet the vote-transfer feature of PV allows the same group of minority voters to differ internally over a set of candidates and still elect a candidate or candidates from within that set, provided they are supportive of the set. Intra-minority competition is less likely to negate electoral opportunities in a PV system than in a limited or cumulative (or even a single-member district, plurality vote) arrangement.

PV is certainly no less democratic than the voting rules traditionally attached to the multi-seat electoral format in this country; in fact, it is arguably more democratic. PV satisfies the basic "one-person, one-vote" requirement in that every voter enters the voting booth with the same number of votes (one) and the same option to rank as many candidates as they desire. It is not a difficult system for voters to use.

Cincinnati is the only place in the United States where the adoption of PV has been under serious consideration in recent years, although Cambridge (Mass.) has used it since 1941. PV has been the subject of two ballot initiatives in Cincinnati, one in 1988 and again in 1991. The enhanced representation of African-Americans expected to result from PV elections was a major theme in each of the initiative campaigns, and the African-American voters in Cincinnati supported a change to PV in both elections.

PV is deserving of far wider consideration. Lawyers and others seeking remedies for dilutive election arrangements would be well advised to consider PV along with limited and cumulative voting when examining alternatives to single-member districts. PV will not only provide an electorally cohesive minority with opportunities to elect candidates of its choice comparable to these other systems, it will accommodate electoral competition within the minority. Competition, including intra-minority competition, should be viewed in a democracy as a healthy electoral condition. Under PV, such competition can be encouraged, while the opportunity to elect minority candidates of choice still remains viable.

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## Preference Voting

Preference Voting is what is known as a modified at-large system. It is a form of proportional representation used in Cambridge MA, Australia, and various European countries that gives representation to majority and minority interests in a manner that is fair and that wastes as few votes as possible.

Compared to the current system used to elect the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, there are five main differences:

- 1) The number of votes needed by a candidate to win a seat is reduced, from the current 35-45% of the whole city's vote to 9% (assuming all 11 supervisor seats are run at the same time). This reduced threshold has the effect of opening up the races to underrepresented perspectives, and allowing both minority and majority interests to win seats in competitive elections without having to draw controversial gerrymandered district lines.
- 2) Because a candidate needs less votes, the amount of money a candidate needs to spend to win a seat decreases. Candidates can do targeted campaigning to win their 9% of the vote from specific constituencies and neighborhoods, and they can concentrate on the issues important to those constituencies and neighborhoods, rather than concentrating on fundraising and flooding the entire city with their posters, signs, pamphlets and TV/radio advertisements.
- 3) Voters get to rank candidates in an order of preference (1,2,3,4, etc.), so that if a voter's top choice doesn't win their vote transfers to their lower choices until their vote helps elect someone. This feature gets rid of "lesser of two evils" voting, and your bottom choices can't help defeat your top choices.
- 4) Voters receive one effective vote (limited vote)-- known as a "smart" ballot -- which prevents 45-50% of voters (the B voters in the graphic series) from electing all 11 seats on the Board of Supervisors.
- 5) Winners candidates are those who reach a minimum threshold of votes that is based on the number of seats and the number of total votes cast. If there are five seats to be filled, the threshold for election is 20% of the total votes cast ( $100\% \div 5 \text{ seats} = 20\%$ ). If there are six seats the threshold is 16.6% ( $100\% \div 6 \text{ seats} = 16.6\%$ ). For the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, if all 11 seats are run at once the threshold will be 9% ( $100\% \div 11 \text{ seats} = 9\%$ ). The more seats run at once, then the lower is the threshold, the greater are the opportunities for minority candidates (A and C voters in the graphic series) to win a seat, and the greater are the opportunities that the election will produce a board of supervisors that represents the whole city (A, B, C voters).



# CUMULATIVE VOTING IN A MUNICIPAL ELECTION: A NOTE ON VOTER REACTIONS AND ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES

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and

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CUMULATIVE voting was used to elect members of a local governing body in the United States for the first time this century when, in July of 1987, The City of Alamogordo, New Mexico employed that voting system to elect part of its city council.<sup>1</sup> This was the first use of the system in any public election in this country since the State of Illinois, in 1980, adopted a single-member districting arrangement to elect the lower chamber of its state legislature, thereby abandoning the system of cumulative voting within three-member districts it had been using for over 100 years.<sup>2</sup>

Rules permitting cumulative voting may be employed in conjunction with any multimember district. If voters in such a district are provided with more than one vote, cumulative voting allows them to aggregate or cumulate their votes behind a particular candidate or candidates if they wish. For example, in a three-seat, three-vote situation, voters have the option of casting their votes in the traditional manner, giving each of three different candidates one of their votes, or they may cast two votes for one candidate and one for another, or even cast all three votes for one candidate. Cumulative voting, in short, allows voters to do more than choose among candidates, it allows them to express the intensity of their preferences as well (see generally Lakeman 1974: 87-90).

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<sup>1</sup> Leon Weaver (1984: 195, 205 n. 6) reports that there were some applications of cumulative voting at the local level during the nineteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> The modification was associated with a one-third reduction in the number of seats in the chamber. This "cutback amendment" to the state constitution, placed on the November 1980 ballot through the initiative of citizens, was a reaction to the state's legislation granting themselves a 40 percent pay raise in 1978 (Everson et al. 1982). According to Grofman (1982: 121), passage of the amendment "had little or nothing to do with support/opposition to cumulative voting."

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Cumulative voting was adopted in Alamogordo as part of the settlement of a voting rights lawsuit. Alamogordo's population in 1980 (24,080) was 24.0 percent Hispanic and 5.3 percent black. Plaintiffs, representing both minority groups, argued that the system for electing the city council in Alamogordo would dilute the votes of the city's minority voters, and therefore violated the Voting Rights Act (see generally Engstrom 1985). Alamogordo's charter had been amended in 1983 to replace a five-member city council elected entirely at-large in nonpartisan elections with a seven-member council elected through a mixed nonpartisan format, four members elected from single-member districts and three at-large. All council members would serve four-year terms, but the elections were to be staggered. The district representatives were elected in 1984, while the at-large seats were to be filled by another election in 1986. One of the four districts was a "majority minority" district in which a black had been elected in 1984. The suit was filed prior to the 1986 election, however, which was enjoined by a federal district court. The plaintiffs complained that minority voters would be unable to elect a candidate of their choice to one of the at-large seats. (The last time an Hispanic had been elected at-large was 1968; the last at-large election of a black was in 1970.) The mixed arrangement, they argued, would therefore systematically underrepresent minority voters (see generally, Engstrom and McDonald 1986).

While the response of the federal courts to allegations of vote dilution has gone through several phases, the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act permit plaintiffs in such cases to challenge the discriminatory results of election systems; they need not prove discriminatory intent of local officials. To date, virtually every jurisdiction which has been required by federal courts to abandon an at-large system has adopted single-member districts, either exclusively or in combination with some at-large councilmanic seats. However, if a minority group is too dispersed residentially, no districting arrangement may result in a "majority minority" district. Hispanics, as an example, make up a significant proportion of the population in many American cities, especially in the southwest, yet their degree of neighborhood segregation is considerably less than for blacks. In many instances, it simply is not possible to draw districts in such a way to create a safe "Hispanic district."

The Alamogordo settlement retained the four district, three at-large arrangement, but specified that the at-large seats would be elected through cumulative voting. Each voter was to be allowed three votes, to be cast in whole units as he or she saw fit. This modification provided the minority voters with an opportunity to aggregate their votes behind a particular candidate and thereby elect a second minority person to the council. The city was able, with this modification, to

maintain the at-large feature in its representational system. Unlike Illinois, therefore, where the adoption of cumulative voting was motivated by a concern for minority political party representation (Corriveau 1972: 65-67), in Alamogordo it was adopted out of a concern for the representation of the city's racial and language minority residents.

#### RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA SOURCE

The first cumulative voting election was held on July 21, 1987, and it did result in the election of an Hispanic (along with two Anglos) to the Alamogordo city council. The following examines the reactions of Alamogordo's Hispanic, black, and Anglo voters to the cumulative vote option. Specifically, we address four questions. First, did the voters understand the new system, or did they find it complicated relative to the conventional one vote per candidate rule? Second, how did they evaluate the system, favorably or unfavorably? Third, to what extent did they utilize the cumulative option, rather than vote in the more conventional one vote per candidate fashion? And fourth, was the cumulative option critical to the Hispanic candidate's success?

Data addressing these matters were collected through an exit poll conducted on election day. An effort was made to have all voters respond to a confidential self-administered questionnaire at each of the city's five polling places. The questionnaire was returned by 33.2 percent of the people signing in to vote that day ( $n = 1,310$ ). While this is not a random sample of voters, we know of no biases in the sample. Indeed, the "votes" cast in the exit poll for the eight candidates in the election not only replicated exactly the order of finish in the actual vote, but no candidate's percentage of the vote in the poll was more than 1.4 percentage points different from that candidate's percentage of the actual vote.

#### FINDINGS

##### *Voter Understanding*

Cumulative voting expands the options that voters have when they enter the voting booth. A possible criticism of the system, therefore, is that it will be confusing to voters (Dunn 1972: 655-58; Everson et al. 1982: 23). Indeed, one commentary has noted that "its complexity could present special problems to members of minority groups, who are often less familiar with the voting process and tend to have less formal education" (Note 1982: 155). In an attempt to assess voter understanding of the system in Alamogordo, voters were presented with two simple questions in the exit poll: "Did you know that you could cast all three of your votes for the same candidate?" and "Did you know that you

other voters' elections in which you have voted, did you find this system any more difficult to understand?" Results are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1  
VOTER UNDERSTANDING

Did you know that you could cast all three of your votes for the same candidate?		Did you find this system any more difficult to understand?	
YES	NO	YES	NO
Total	95.0%	Total	13.1%
Anglo	96.0	Anglo	13.1
Black	91.7	Black	11.3
Hispanic	90.0	Hispanic	11.7

Source: Authors' survey.

It can be seen in Table 1 that almost all (95.0 percent) of the Alamogordo voters understood their option to "plump" (Wiggins and Petty 1979: 346) all of their votes behind a single candidate. While it was the case that smaller percentages of minority voters seemed to understand this option than Anglo voters, the differences were minimal.<sup>1</sup> It can also be seen in Table 1 that only about 13 percent of the voters found the cumulative voting scheme more difficult to understand than traditional voting plans. Virtually no ethnic or racial differences were noted on this dimension.

### Voter Evaluations

Substantial group differences did appear, however, in voters' evaluations of the system. They were asked to rate the system along a four-point scale ranging from "poor" to "excellent." The results, reported in Table 2, show considerable variation across the groups. Not surprisingly, given that the adoption of cumulative voting was in response to minority demands for increased representation, minority voters viewed the system much more positively than Anglo voters. Both blacks and Hispanics were favorable overall, with 72.7 percent of the

<sup>1</sup> Respondents are classified according to their self-reported group identifications. Most (77.8 percent) identified themselves as Anglo, while 12.7 percent selected Hispanic and 4.4 percent black. The remaining 5.2 percent either identified themselves as "other" or failed to designate an identification.

TABLE 2  
VOTER EVALUATION

How do you like this new election system?		Poor		Fair		Good		Excellent	
Total	42.8%	14.2%	27.2%	14.2%	24.8	13.2	29.1	35.5	23.7
Anglo	47.8	14.2	24.8	13.2	29.1	35.5	23.7		
Black	9.1	18.2	43.6	29.1	35.5	23.7			
Hispanic	24.4	15.4	36.5	23.7					

Source: Authors' survey.

Voters were also asked in the exit poll to report which candidate or candidates they had voted for, and the number of votes they had provided to each. Reported in Table 3 is the percentage of voters, overall and by group, that cast two or three votes for any particular candidate. Over 70 percent of the voters (70.3 percent) actually used the cumulative option and cast at least two ballots for one candidate. Stated alternatively, only about 30 percent elected to vote in the traditional one vote per candidate fashion. It can be seen in Table 3 that over 43 percent of voters cast all three ballots for one candidate. Table 3 shows as well that while significant majorities of all racial and ethnic groups used the cumulative vote features of the plan, Hispanics used the

TABLE 3  
VOTER UTILIZATION

Did voter cast more than one vote for any candidate?		NO		YES	
Total	29.7%	70.3%	2 for one: 27.1%	3 for one: 43.2	
Anglo	31.2	68.8	2 for one: 29.3	3 for one: 59.5	
Black	38.3	61.7	2 for one: 21.3	3 for one: 40.4	
Hispanic	18.2	81.8	2 for one: 17.6	3 for one: 64.2	

Source: Authors' survey.



system in significantly higher proportions than either blacks or Anglos. In fact, the percentage of Hispanics casting all three ballots for one candidate (64.2 percent) almost equals the percentage of blacks or Anglos cumulating their votes in any way (that is, casting either two or three votes for any particular candidate). It can be concluded that voters did make significant use of the cumulative vote system in Alamogordo and that Hispanics, the group most obviously advantaged by the system, used it most heavily.

### Electoral Consequences

As noted above, an Hispanic candidate, Inez Moncada, was elected to an at-large seat in this cumulative voting election. Can her election be attributed to the change in the voting system? While it may be impossible to say with certainty what would have happened in the absence of the cumulative option, evidence from the exit poll suggests that the systemic change was critical to her victory.

Table 4 contains the results of the exit poll balloting. When ranked according to the number of voters casting votes for each candidate, Ms. Moncada placed fourth. She finished third in total votes, however, because over half of those voting for her (52.9 percent) gave her more than a single vote. Moncada's support, in short, was more intense than that for any other candidate. Without the opportunity to operationalize the intensity with which they preferred Ms. Moncada, it seems unlikely that the Moncada voters would have succeeded in placing her on the council.<sup>4</sup>

Ms. Moncada's support, not surprisingly, came disproportionately from Hispanics. The group-based breakdown of her vote is reported in Table 5. Seventy-three percent of the Hispanics reported casting a vote for her, compared to 40.4 percent of the blacks (among whom she was the most preferred candidate) and only 21.8 percent of the Anglos. Most importantly, almost 80 percent of the Hispanics who did vote for her gave her more than one vote (68.5 percent gave her all three). Clearly, these voters were using the new system to increase the probability that the candidate most favored by them would be elected. But Ms. Moncada's Hispanic support, by itself, was not sufficient for her to win a seat. Her third place finish overall was dependent, at least in the exit poll, on her support from Anglo voters as well. Although she would not have been elected if only the votes of Anglos had been counted (she was the fourth choice of Anglo voters), the votes she

<sup>4</sup> If it is assumed that respondents casting two or three votes for any particular candidate would have "single-shot" voted for that candidate (if this had been a traditional runoff election), the results would have been as follows:

TABLE 4  
VOTING IN EXIT POLL

Candidate	Number of Voters Who Cast One or More Votes for Candidate	Number of Voters Who Cast			Total Number of Votes Received
		One Vote For Candidate on Left	Two Votes	Three Votes	
Downs (A, M)	433	245	76	114	737
Moncada (H, F)	351	156	45	150	636
Seamans (A, M)	184	119	25	40	289
Welling (A, M)	64	51	3	10	87
Watts (A, F)	127	66	16	45	235
Riordan (A, M)	423	277	74	72	641
Furrow (A, M)	89	72	7	10	116
Carroll (A, M)	391	284	53	54	552

Note. Candidate names are listed as appearing on the ballot. Letters in parentheses indicate ethnicity (A = Anglo; H = Hispanic) and sex.

Source: Authors survey.

received from Anglos were necessary for her victory. Cumulative voting by Hispanics, therefore, while critical to her success, cannot account completely for her election.

Cumulative voting was used for the first time this century in a municipal election in the United States in Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 1987. Voters in that city appear to have readily understood the system and to have utilized extensively their cumulative options. This was especially true of Hispanic voters, whose use of the system was critical to the election at-large of an Hispanic candidate.

The cumulative system was adopted in Alamogordo in response to minority voters complaints that at-large elections diluted their voting strength. The experience in Alamogordo demonstrates that

TABLE 5  
BREAKDOWN OF VOTE FOR HISPANIC CANDIDATE

Percent of Vote for Hispanic Candidate	Percent of Vote Combination for Hispanic Candidate		
	One Vote	Two Votes	Three Votes
% of Anglos voting for Hispanic	21.8	63.3	13.8
% of Blacks voting for Hispanic	40.4	47.4	15.8
% of Hispanics voting for Hispanic	73.0	20.4	68.5

SOURCE: Authors survey.

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\* Cumulative voting's utility as a remedy for dilution was illustrated again, in 1988, when black candidates in four local governmental jurisdictions in Alabama were elected at-large, despite blacks constituting only 10 to 12 percent of the population in these communities. Voters were allowed to cumulate seven votes in these elections (Karlan 1989: 234-35; see also Still, 1984: 255-58). Cumulative voting schemes have also been adopted recently, as a result of the settlement of voting rights lawsuits, for future elections for the city council in Peoria, Illinois, and for the school boards for the Sisseton School District No. 54-5 in South Dakota and the Lockhart Independent School District in Texas.

Keep this Brochure  
to help you decide

## How You VOTE

Every registered voter has *two* votes at the 19 September Referendum. And the voting paper consists of two separate pieces of paper: PART A and PART B.

PART A contains what are called "the voting system proposals".

Voting in PART A of the voting paper is simple. You just put a tick (✓) next to *one* of the following two statements:



Vote Here

I VOTE TO RETAIN THE PRESENT  
FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM.

I VOTE FOR A CHANGE TO THE  
VOTING SYSTEM.



PART B contains what are called "the reform options". You *may* vote for one of the reform options but you do not have to. And if you vote *against* changing our Present First-Past-the-Post system in PART A, you can still vote for one of the reform options in PART B.

Voting in PART B of the voting paper is also simple. You just put a tick (✓) next to *one* of the following four statements:



Vote Here

I VOTE FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY  
MEMBER SYSTEM (SM).

I VOTE FOR THE SINGLE  
TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM (STV).

I VOTE FOR THE MIXED MEMBER  
PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM (MMP).

I VOTE FOR THE PREFERENTIAL  
VOTING SYSTEM (PV).



***Make the most of your vote!***

*You can vote for both Part A and Part B, or you may choose to vote on A or B. All votes will be counted.*

 **Referendum'92**

*The Decision's With You*

19 SEPTEMBER '92 ✓



MINORITY REPORT OF CHRISTOPHER L. BOWMAN, ELECTIONS TASK FORCE  
MEMBER, FOR INCLUSION INTO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTIONS  
TASK FORCE, May 1, 1995.

First, I wish to thank Mayor Frank Jordan for providing me the opportunity to again serve the people of San Francisco by appointing me to the Elections Task Force. By doing so, he ensured that one of the largest voting blocs in the City was represented in these important deliberations.

As the lone Republican on the Elections Task Force, it was with some trepidation and misgivings that I began my work. I must say that my apprehensions were misplaced. All of the members of the Task Force from very diverse political and professional backgrounds evaluated facts and proposals on their merit, and the more than three month long process has been like going back to graduate school for all of us -- a basic educational experience in which our worldview has expanded.

The successes of the Task Force are in part attributable to the even-handed and soft-spoken leadership of Gwenn Craig who tactfully taught us how to really listen to one another and to the public and who translated what she heard into workable motions.

In San Francisco, Republicans are the largest minority not currently represented on the Board of Supervisors. It is my professional judgment that Republicans will fare well under all of the four proposed systems.

It is also my professional judgment that smaller minorities -- Chinese Americans, Hispanics, and African Americans will have the potential of winning between five and seven seats on the Board under three of the four systems proposed. (There are currently four minority Supervisors, and the prospect is great that once Supervisor Kennedy retires, African Americans will be unable to elect a representative under the current at-large system.)

The fourth system is a concern to me. A simulation run by Professor Richard DeLeon of San Francisco State University suggests that African Americans may not be able to elect a member of their community under the proposed At-Large system using Preference Voting. Therefore, I believe the proposed At-Large system using Cumulative Voting is the better of the two modified At-Large systems being proposed by the Task Force.

Although the 5/3 Plan (Five Districts each electing three Supervisors) would create the most representative Board that we have ever had, I did not vote for the proposal because it didn't incorporate a Limited Voting system (I wanted each of the three Proportional Representation models to be included in three of our four proposals) and because, frankly, I don't know how the City will be able to pay for four additional Supervisors and eight additional staffers when we are facing

a \$100,000,000 budget shortfall. If the City's fiscal health in the future changes radically for the better and we have successive years of budget surplusses, this system would be my first choice for change.

On the issue of salaries, I believe that the job of Supervisor should be considered as full-time, and that Supervisors should receive a full-time salary. The additional costs can be more than off-set by streamlining how the Board utilizes its staff.

It should be noted that many people have proposed a mixed system, even though such a system is not included within the Task Force's proposals. Perhaps 9 Districts and 2 At-Large; 7 Districts and 4 At-Large, or 11 Districts and 4 At-Large. If costs were not a factor I would favor the third alternative. It is my professional judgment, however, that the other mixed systems are deficient in their ability to create a diverse Board and would probably not be conducive to electing any Republican to the Board because with larger single-member districts, inevitably the voting power of minorities is diluted. Under a 9/2 plan, the at-large Supervisor would inevitably be a liberal Democrat and future Presidents of the Board would follow in the footsteps of Nancy Walker, Harry Britt, Doris Ward, Angela Alioto, and Kevin Shelley.

Many Republicans have asked about Numbered Seats with run-offs. On the positive side, such a system would create accountability. On the other hand, Republicans or ethnic minorities would not be elected under Numbered Seats because they would require an absolute majority. Currently, you need between 28% and 39% of the votes cast to get elected to the Board. Thus, (assuming one could clone Supervisors), we would elect under such a system five Barbara Kaufmans and six Kevin Shelleys. Not a very diverse crew.

The Task Force did take a wrong turn when it voted by a 5-3-1 vote to change the way vacancies on the Board are filled. For as long as anyone can remember, the Mayor has appointed vacancies to the Board. In all other 57 counties of California, the Governor fills Supervisorial vacancies. The person appointed in San Francisco currently serves until the rest of the term and then goes up for election.


The majority of the Task Force recommended that the Board itself fill the vacancy and that the appointee be up for election at the next regularly scheduled election. This is defective on four grounds:

- 1) It creates a Conflict of Interest in that a slim six vote faction of the Board could enhance its control of the Board by filling vacancies;
- 2) Under District Elections, if the majority on the Board is Liberal, and the District is Conservative, a Liberal might be imposed on the Conservative District. Or visaversa.
- 3) If it is valid to elect Supervisors only in odd-numbered years, there is at least a 50% chance that the appointed Supervisor would have to run in an even-numbered year election.

4) The Board already has the right to appoint the Mayor should the Mayor resign, die, or become incapacitated. By giving the Board the additional ability to appoint its own members would violate the balance of power between the two branches of government.

A final note. Virtually everyone has expressed concerns about how the district lines will be drawn and who will draw them. I am clear about two things. First, the Task Force has explicitly set specific criteria on the drawing of lines which if incorporated, as is, into the City Charter will ensure that there isn't any gerrymandering for partisan advantage or to the disadvantage of any minority group. Second, the Board of Supervisors, or any other City official, must not have a hand in drawing the lines. Good government principles dictate that such a Conflict of Interest be avoided at all costs. Maps created by the Board, et al., however fair, would be rejected out-of-hand by the voters.





**MINORITY REPORT**  
**Samson Wong, S.F. Elections Task Force Member**  
**April 28, 1995**

The S.F. Board of Supervisors, Mayor, and Registrar of Voters should be commended for putting together the diverse nine member S.F. Elections Task Force. It is even more surprising that these nearly mutually exclusive bodies can put together such a diverse task force. This Task Force member would like bring up several points:

**ETHNIC MINORITY REPRESENTATION:** Despite the fact that this City is over 50% ethnic minority, only four of eleven Board members are ethnic minority. This task force has seen, but not critically analyzed some of the sample district election maps which can potentially elect underrepresented ethnic minorities.

Future district map drafters must refer to the draft eleven-district maps produced by Commissioner Christopher Bowman (April 1995 map) and consultant David Binder (May 1993 map). Their maps call for eight districts where close to or over a majority of the population is ethnic minority.

Furthermore, in the Bowman/Binder maps, underrepresented ethnic minorities have pluralities in districts. Specifically, it is possible to draw maps where African Americans potentially have a plurality in one district, Asian Pacific Islander Americans have three to four districts with a plurality, and Hispanics have one district.

These districts have the potential to elect ethnic minorities which can only be realized with voter education, registration, and turnout efforts by the Registrar of Voters, community and political organizations, which can now focus their enfranchisement efforts.

**CUMULATIVE/PREFERENCE VOTING:** This task force member is concerned about new voting methods which may provide the opportunity for ethnic minority voters to empower themselves. However, we must first consider that voters find it difficult enough to understand the significance and mechanics of voting.

Particularly, with over 7000 Chinese language voters and 1000 Spanish language voters, and with voters whose literacy is below the eighth grade level required by the voter handbook, this task force member is concerned about complicating voting and imposing a lesser form of a "literacy test" on voters. Members of the task force and the Registrar of Voters will probably be the first to admit that they have difficulty explaining the preference system.

In theory, the cumulative voting system appears to work for voting blocs that are "cohesive" or more likely to "bullet vote." However, as our esteemed Chair Gwenn Craig has pointed out, cumulative may discourage coalition building. Simplistically, cumulative may work among an African American constituency which overwhelmingly votes with the Democratic Party. However, cumulative may not work with the less cohesive Asian American voting bloc (refer to Binder/Lew exit poll in 1992, Grant Din, Don Nakanishi, Wendy Tam studies).

Voters and the S.F. Board of Supervisors should balance these concerns about cumulative and preference voting with the current "winner take all" system, where the losing minority is excluded from representation. Any imposition of a new method of voting or new system of electing the Board must require substantial outreach by the S.F. Registrar and community agencies.

**REJECT "HISTORIC DISTRICT ELECTION" LINES:** At a community hearing, a long time advocate of district elections suggested returning to "historic district election" lines. Reviewing those lines, this Task Force member finds that those lines do not reflect the realities of the 1990 Census and the suggested criteria for drafting maps. For example, the "historic" proposal



cuts the Sunset District in half through Ortega Street. By doing this, both neighborhood interests of the Sunset and Asian American interests (nearly 50% of Sunset population) would be gerrymandered.

**SMALL BUSINESS REPRESENTATION:** The representation of the small business community is a concern. One President of a minority business association criticized the current Board of Supervisors for not understanding the concerns of the small business community. Would the recommended election systems help or hurt the small business community?

Given the short time, this Task Force member did not bring up this question of candidate residency. Given the transient nature of our population, the Board of Supervisors might choose to examine the candidate requirements for residency in a district. Some San Franciscans who live in one district might spend more time in his/her life working in another district. Thus, San Franciscans might know more about where they work rather than where they live. Since this City is among the highest to rent or own a home in the nation, residents might choose to move around in search of affordable housing, but remain in the same place of work. Overall, candidates must live in San Francisco. To run in a district, the Board might examine having the option of residency or workplace.

S.F. Elections Task Force  
April 27, 1995  
Prepared by Samson Wong

This is being submitted as a  
minority report. This was  
not adopted by the Task Force.  
-Samson Wong, Member

**RESOLUTION: REPRESENTATION OF RACIAL MINORITIES IN DISTRICT  
ELECTIONS OF SUPERVISORS**

Whereas the S.F. Elections Task Force has supported the  
criteria for evaluating systems of electing the San  
Francisco Board of Supervisors and evaluating maps for forms  
of district-elected systems;

Whereas the criteria includes the impact on neighborhood  
representation and racial minority interests;

Where the City and County of San Francisco population is  
over 50% racial minority;

Whereas only four of eleven members of the S.F. Board of  
Supervisors are racial minorities who have been  
traditionally underrepresented on the S.F. Board of  
Supervisors;

Whereas underrepresented racial minorities include, but are  
not exclusively, the African, Asian/Pacific Islander, and  
Hispanic communities;

BE IT RESOLVED: That the S.F. Elections Task Force recommend  
that the following guide future district map drafting under  
the eleven district plan;

BE IT RESOLVED: That future district drafters examine  
district election maps drafted by Commissioner Christopher  
Bowman on April 1995 and consultant David Binder of the S.F.  
Elections Task Force on May 1993;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That drafters consider District 1,  
3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11 under Bowman and Districts 1, 3,  
4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11 under Binder as potential districts  
whose majority population consists of racial minorities.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That drafters consider District 10  
under Bowman and District 6 under Binder as potential  
African American districts;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That drafters consider District 1,  
4, 6, and 11 under Bowman and District 1, 3, and 10 under  
Binder as potential Asian/Pacific Islander American  
districts;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That drafters consider District 9  
under Bowman and District 5 under Binder as potential  
Hispanic American districts;

S.F. Elections Task Force  
April 27, 1995  
Prepared by Samson Wong

**RESOLUTION: REPRESENTATION OF RACIAL MINORITIES IN DISTRICT  
ELECTIONS OF SUPERVISORS, page 2**

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That drafters consider the above when they draft district plans that call for more than or less than eleven Supervisors;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That the S.F. Elections Task Force recognizes the potential of racial minorities in these and other districts to elect and influence those Supervisors in these districts;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That, despite this potential, the S.F. Elections Task Force strongly urges that the S.F. Registrar of Voters conduct outreach to help educate, register, and turnout to vote those citizens who have been traditionally underrepresented in precincts that are consistently below citywide turnout averages; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That the "historic district election" lines as suggested for consideration by the S.F. Elections Task Force on April 13 do not reflect the 1990 Census dramatic changes in populations of racial minorities.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED: That this resolution be communicated to the S.F. Board of Supervisors, future drafters of district election maps, and all interested publics.



